Chatham House’s recent report, Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State by Peter Salisbury, provides a background for the post-2011 transition and conflict, and offers recommendations for Yemen’s political process and future government.
The unintended consequences of the war on AQAP
The war on terror waged by Western governments in Yemen has not only failed to achieve its goals, but has in fact strengthened the exact groups it hoped to defeat. A recent piece in Foreign Policy by Jack Watling and Namir Shabibi explains why military training and financial incentives provided to Yemen’s government by the US and the UK to defeat al-Qaeda have brought about disastrous unintended consequences. In the eight years that Western governments have provided military training to troops in Yemen, al-Qaeda has expanded its territory and increased its membership. For a year up until last month, AQAP ruled a mini-state in Yemen’s port city of Mukalla. Local officials estimate the group earned $2 million a day from taxes on fuel and goods, illustrating both AQAP's financial success and the utter failure by Western governments to defeat the militant group.
But the counter-terrorism push by Washington and London was not always a failure. The early years of the fight against AQAP, from 2001 to 2005, were so successful that the two governments considered the group defeated and cut back significantly on aid to Yemen. Shortly thereafter, 23 senior militants escaped from a Yemeni prison, renewing the al-Qaeda threat and the aid money.
The response set the worst possible precedent. It effectively tied millions of dollars in aid — and the corresponding support for President Saleh — not to al Qaeda’s elimination, but to its continued presence. From that moment, Yemeni efforts to confront the insurgency lost their previous vigor.
The strategy of direct military assistance presented its own challenges. Upon the creation of Western-trained Yemeni anti-terrorism units, the amount of operations against al-Qaeda notably decreased. This was in part due to an unwillingness of Yemeni troops to interfere in tribal areas, but also represented the troops' understanding that, if their aim was achieved and al-Qaeda was defeated, their unit would no longer be needed.
Independent efforts by Western governments to defeat AQAP, such as drone strikes, have also had unintended consequences. The numerous civilian deaths resulting from drone attacks roused anger among average Yemenis, facilitating recruitment by al-Qaeda. Ultimately, all of these efforts to defeat AQAP were a waste of time, money, and lives, and should serve as a lesson for any future attempts to defeat the group.
Amnesty International documents arbitrary arrests by Houthis
Amnesty International’s May report on detention and disappearance in Houthi-controlled Yemen examines 60 cases of Houthi forces arresting political opposition figures, activists, and journalists as part of their efforts to suppress opposition. Those arrested are held without charge for as long as 17 months, sometimes tortured and mistreated, and consistently denied legal representation. To arrive at their findings, Amnesty conducted interviews between May 2015 and April 2016 with 12 former detainees and over 60 relatives and friends of those imprisoned, as well as activists and lawyers.
Amnesty was unable to determine the exact number of political detainees, but one San’a-based lawyer said relatives of more than 200 detainees have submitted reports of arbitrary arrest and detention. The total number of political prisoners held by Houthi forces in Yemen is likely much higher.
Those who have witnessed or have been subject to arrest say that Ansarullah, the Houthi’s political wing, “carried out detentions in homes, in front of family members, at security checkpoints, at workplaces, or in public venues such as mosques, without arrest warrants and with no explanation of the reasons or grounds for detention, and without providing any information about where the detained were being taken.”
We found out that [our relative] was being tortured in a barbaric manner and his health was deteriorating. We begged the Houthis in every way possible to permit us to visit him but they continued to refuse our requests...After many mediation efforts with Houthi officials and their political office [Ansarullah], we were permitted to see him for a short visit in Eid al-Adha...Since then [mid-September], we have not been able to see him or check up on him.
Detainees who are suspected to have voiced opposition to the Houthi takeover or spoken in favor of the Saudi-led coalition are labelled as “dawa’ish” (supporters of ISIS), or “supporters of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition aggression on Yemen,” in an attempt to justify their detention. Some journalists are accused of providing GPS coordinates to the coalition.
Amnesty International recommends that “The de facto Houthi authorities and aligned institutions in San’a, as well as the internationally recognised government of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi and any post-war government, should ensure that...all such cases are investigated impartially and independently and that individuals against whom sufficient admissible evidence is found of responsibility for serious violations, are prosecuted in proceedings that fully respect international fair trial standards. Victims and their families must receive full reparation.”
What benefits remain in the U.S.-Saudi alliance?
The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington hosted a discussion on Wednesday on the nature of U.S.-Saudi relations and the conflicts and challenges that could threaten their close alliance. Heading the discussion was F. Gregory Gause, an AGSIW board member and professor of international affairs. In response to recent friction in U.S.-Saudi relations, and the apparent absence of shared interests and strategic goals, some have predicted that ties between the two countries may soon be broken. Gause, however, says it is unlikely that the U.S. would distance itself from Saudi Arabia, as it remains an important ally in a region that lacks political leadership.
“It is extremely useful to have a good working relationship with countries that actually govern their territory and that have some influence in areas where real governance no longer exists,” Gause says, adding that the Saudis "are susceptible to the normal instruments of diplomacy and have influence in these areas where governance has collapsed or is contested in the region.”
Gause explains that the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. started with the dependence of the Saudi oil industry on American companies and the countries’ shared strategic interests during the Cold War. Today, those interests seem to have disappeared, with Saudi Arabia now controlling its own oil and tackling regional conflicts in a different way than the. U.S.
Gause cites the perception of Iran’s role in the Middle East as the main difference in U.S.-Saudi strategic relations. Saudi Arabia views most conflicts in the region, such as those in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, through the lens of Iranian influence, while the U.S. sees these conflicts as stemming from domestic instabilities.
In view of these differences, why are both sides working to sustain this relationship? Gause asserts that there are still a significant number of common interests that unite Washington and Riyadh. Both sides see Salafi jihadism as a threat and both have an interest in preventing any other power from dominating the Gulf region and the Middle East as a whole.
Yemen in particular illustrates the strategic differences and commonalities between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. As Gause says, “Yemen encapsulates both the tensions in bilateral relations and the desire by both sides to sustain the relationship despite these tensions.”
“The U.S. has no quarrel with the Houthis. The only real interest the U.S. has been willing to act on in Yemen in recent years has been the priority of attacking Salafi jihadists...and we worry that the Saudi intervention is going to indirectly increase the influence of Salafi jihadists in Yemen, and yet the U.S. has been willing to support the Emirati-Saudi campaign.”
Saudi Arabia is often charged with exporting the exact Salafi jihadist ideology that the U.S. is committed to defeating, but Gause explains that this strain of Islamic extremism is not a purely Saudi phenomenon.
He rejects the claim made by Senator Chris Murphy (who introduced legislation to increase oversight of U.S. weapon sales to Saudi Arabia) that the kingdom is only a few degrees removed from terrorists inspired by the ISIS ideology. Gause says that if the Saudis did ever have ideological or political control over Salafism in the past, it has since lost it.
Gause also questions how the U.S. would go about distancing itself from Saudi Arabia. Unlike countries such as Egypt or Jordan, the U.S. does not provide Saudi Arabia with foreign aid that could be suspended. If arm sales were halted, Saudis could easily purchase them elsewhere, and if the intelligence relationship was cut off, it would only serve to harm American interests.
“It’s hard for me to avoid the conclusion that the talk of distancing ourselves from Riyadh has no practical benefit and is simply an emotional reaction. But foreign policy isn’t simply about feeling good about ourselves, it’s about furthering our country’s interests, and having a decent relationship with Saudi Arabia advances those interests.”
May 9-15: Mukalla struck by series of IS bombings, UN talks push forward
Monday, May 9Over 800 workers were evicted from Aden by local pro-secessionist security forces on Sunday. Those forcibly removed from shops, restaurants, and homes in the southern city were mostly from Ta’iz, which is located in north Yemen according to the pre-1990 borders. The security forces, who were appointed by Hadi, deemed the northerners "a threat to security," but Hadi himself quickly condemned the evictions, calling them “unacceptable.”
Mukalla’s airport was reopened following the withdrawal of al-Qaeda forces, who occupied the port city for a year. The first flight reportedly arrived Sunday from the UAE carrying Red Crescent medical supplies.
Tuesday, May 10 US Central Command News Release announced recent drone strikes against al-Qaeda in Yemen. This update was issued at the same time as the Pentagon admitted to deploying “military advisors” in Yemen to assist the UAE in fighting al-Qaeda. “The U.S. military has conducted four counterterrorism airstrikes against the al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula terrorist organization in Yemen in recent weeks, killing 10 al-Qaida operatives and injuring one…”
Saudi coalition spokesman Brigadier General Ahmed al-Asiri has accused the Houthis and Saleh of direct cooperation with al-Qaeda. This is despite numerous reports within the last year that Saudi coalition forces have fought alongside al-Qaeda in their battle against the Houthis. Al-Asiri later said that if peace talks in Kuwait fail, the Saudi-led coalition is prepared to launch a military operation to enter San’a.
UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed said that both sides to the Kuwait talks reached an agreement to exchange half of all prisoners within the next 20 days. The number of total prisoners involved is unclear, and may range from a few hundred to a few thousand.
Wednesday, May 11 At least 10 troops were killed in three different attacks by IS militants who detonated car bombs outside military and naval bases in Mukalla. The attacks come a month after the city was retaken from al-Qaeda by Yemeni and UAE forces.
Thursday, May 12 The UN reports that Yemen’s food situation is on the verge of humanitarian disaster unless urgent funding is accessible for the Food and Agriculture Organization. The report states that agriculture must be an integral part of the humanitarian response plan, as aid organizations will not be able to provide the amount of food needed for the 14.4 million Yemenis urgently in need of assistance.
Friday, May 13 UN Envoy Ould Cheikh Ahmed reported that the Houthi and government delegations discussed proposals to bridge the gap between their respective visions, reaching consensus on some issues. He added that “progress is being achieved, albeit at a relatively slow pace.”
Sunday, May 15 The second IS suicide bombing in Mukalla in one week targeted a police base Sunday morning, killing 31 recruits who were waiting outside the building. Sixty were left critically injured.
AQAP's strategy to win Yemenis' hearts and minds
Elisabeth Kendall’s recent piece in The Washington Post reveals the true challenges of battling al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and explains why the organization has been able to maintain local support by using what Kendall describes as “Robin Hood” tactics. Despite widespread disapproval of al-Qaeda’s extremist ideology, many Yemenis living in towns controlled by militants will admit that the group has an ability to provide basic services, such as repairing water lines and resolving local disputes--things that Yemen’s government is frequently unable or unwilling to do.
Although AQAP still carried out periodic Sharia punishments, such as execution for adultery or sorcery and amputation for theft, its primary emphasis had shifted onto local power-sharing models accompanied by an energetic program of community development. To help fund this, it robbed the rich in the name of the poor. Three months ago, AQAP wrote to oil and telecoms companies in Mukalla, demanding large payments ‘in order to meet the needs of the people.’
The strategy of shoring up local support, or at least tolerance, for extremist Islamic groups by providing social services has also been implemented by the Islamic State group, Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood. This strategy is particularly effective in a war-torn country like Yemen, where militant groups can provide relative stability in the face of governmental ineptitude and dire need for basic services.
Kendall also notes that the recent ‘defeat’ of al-Qaeda in Mukalla, resulting in their departure from the city, may have, in fact, constituted an ideological victory for the group, as residents saw their decision to withdraw rather than fight as an effort to avoid civilian casualties.
Kendall concludes that the best strategy for fighting al-Qaeda may lie at the local level, rather than a military or “top-down” approach. As long as al-Qaeda is the only actor providing much-needed aid and support to Yemen’s marginalized communities, they will remain a strong and influential presence in the country.
Senator Murphy speaks to Brookings about revisiting US-Saudi relations
Chris Murphy (D-CT), the US senator who introduced a bill earlier this month to impose limitations on the transfer of US munitions to Saudi Arabia, spoke to the Brookings Institution about why the US should reassess its policies towards the kingdom. In his discussion with Brookings Senior Fellows Bruce Riedel and Tamara Wittes, Murphy acknowledges the important alliance that exists between the two countries, but says that “as time goes on it’s harder and harder to ignore the holes in the relationship,” including Saudi support for an “intolerant brand of Islam” that is often the inspiration for the exact terrorist groups the US aims to defeat.
Senator Murphy cites the war in Yemen as an example of how unwavering US support for the kingdom is sometimes at odds with constructive American foreign policy.
“I think the war in Yemen is example A of a military objective by the Saudis that does not run in accordance with US national security interests…We are overt in our support for this engagement given that it is US munitions that are being dropped, it is US refueling planes that are allowing the missions to continue, and it is US intelligence that is providing information for the targeting.”
The Yemen case provides us with the opportunity to, frankly, reset this relationship because I think it is very hard, if not impossible, to argue that the way in which this war is being conducted today is in the best interests of the United States.
Riedel emphasized that the US does have the power to end the war in Yemen: “If the United States of America and the United Kingdom tonight told King Salman, ‘this war has to end,’ it would end tomorrow because the Royal Saudi Air Force cannot operate without American and British support.”
Riedel added that “what Saudi Arabia has been doing for the last year in Yemen is effectively driving drunk. It’s time for the United States to get out of the back seat and tell the Saudis, “let’s find a way to end this war, which is in our mutual interest.”
Here is a summary of the Murphy-Paul bill that was introduced to Senate on April 13, which would require certification that a number of conditions were met before transferring US weapons to Saudi Arabia.
Congressmen Ted Lieu and Ted Yoho introduced a supporting bill to the House on April 20. H.J. Res 90 would limit the transfer of munitions until Saudi Arabia can demonstrate that it is taking “all feasible precautions” not to harm civilians and making “demonstrable efforts to facilitate the flow of critical humanitarian aid.”
Crisis Group: Can the Kuwait peace talks break Yemen’s deadlock?
Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for the Arabian Peninsula, April Longley Alley, explains in a Q&A why she is cautiously hopeful that this week’s negotiations in Kuwait may see the return of a political process to Yemen. According to Alley, both parties to the war are facing increased pressure to end the conflict. The Houthis have been pushed back on several fronts and are encountering serious economic challenges, making them more open to negotiations. Meanwhile, the Saudis are facing both a tightened budget and pressure from the international community and humanitarian rights organizations to end the war.
What we can say for sure is that this is the best chance that Yemen has had since the beginning of the war to return to a political process. For the first time, the two protagonists with the capacity to end major combat, the Houthis and the Saudis, seem more willing than ever to do so.
Despite the clear advantages of ending the conflict, there are many potential spoilers to a deal. The ongoing ceasefire, which began on midnight on April 11, was quickly violated by both parties, although it is still holding better than previous ceasefires.
Furthermore, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Abdu Rabbuh Mansour Hadi both pose threats to the peace process. Saleh, who has consistently been excluded from talks with the Saudis despite his allegiance with the Houthis, is likely to be a spoiler for current negotiations. Hadi, meanwhile, insists on fully implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which would unrealistically require the Houthis to disarm and withdraw from all seized territory.
As it stands, the ongoing talks in Kuwait do not represent all Yemeni factions relevant to the conflict. As Alley explains, the talks would need to be broadened to ensure an extended ceasefire and resolve political issues such as the timing of elections, transitional justice and state structure.
Of the five focus points of the negotiations outlined by the UN, the most critical, according to Alley, is an agreement on mutually acceptable interim security arrangements, which could provide an environment that facilitates the return of a government.
This opportunity to end the war in Yemen and find a political resolution cannot be missed, say Alley.
“If this chance is not seized, we might be back to a situation where Yemen is off the radar again...with continuing devastating consequences for the civilian population.”
Senators introduce bill to halt US arms transfers to Saudi Arabia
Senators Chris Murphy (D-CT) and Rand Paul (R-KY) introduced legislation on Wednesday to halt the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia until limitations are imposed on the transfer of US munitions to the kingdom. The Murphy-Paul bill would require the president to provide a briefing on the weapons’ usage and certify that a number of conditions were met before the transfer of any US munitions to Saudi Arabia.
This joint resolution comes after repeated accusations that the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has launched airstrikes in violation of international humanitarian law. One of the most severe violations by the coalition was a March airstrike on a Hajjah market that killed over 119 people, mostly civilians, including many children. It was later discovered by Human Rights Watch that munitions used in this attack (the deadliest since the airstrikes began a year ago) were supplied by the United States.
'The more it drags on, the clearer it becomes that our military involvement on behalf of the Saudi-led coalition is prolonging human suffering in Yemen and aiding the very groups that are intent on attacking us,' said Murphy.
The conditions required prior to any future weapon sales include a certification that Saudi Arabia “is not providing funding, material support, or lethal aid to individuals or groups designated by the United States as foreign terrorist organizations,” and that the kingdom and its coalition partners “are taking all feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian objects to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law…”
The bill would also require that Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners are making demonstrable efforts to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid in war-torn Yemen. The final condition is that Saudi Arabia take all necessary measures to target designated foreign terrorist organizations, including AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) and affiliates of the Islamic State group.
In addition to those conditions, the president would need to provide a briefing prior to any weapons sales that includes a description of “the nature, content, costs, and purposes of any United States support…” along with assessments of whether the kingdom’s military operations constitute legitimate self-defense.
The briefing would also assess whether the coalition has deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure and whether Saudi armed forces have used US munitions in any attacks against civilians or civilian infrastructure in Yemen since airstrikes began over a year ago.
Finally, the briefing would outline how US defense equipment transferred to Saudi Arabia would contribute to US efforts to defeat AQAP and the Islamic State group while also promoting US foreign policy and national security objectives in the region.
Under current US law, Congress must be notified of arms sales to foreign governments and legislators must approve these transfers. In practice, however, this process is often too automated to provide any accurate assessment of the use of American weapons abroad.
Here you can watch Senator Murphy discuss the US-Saudi partnership at a Brookings event on April 22.
UN Envoy announces cessation of hostilities, peace talks - UN
The United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, announced on March 23 that all parties to the Yemen conflict have agreed to a cessation of hostilities set to begin on midnight on April 10, preceding peace talks that are scheduled to take place in Kuwait on April 18. According to Ahmed, the talks will be carried out “under the umbrella of three pillars: the GCC initiative, the National Dialogue, and UN resolution 2216” and will work towards ”reaching a comprehensive agreement, which will end the conflict and allow the resumption of inclusive political dialogue in accordance with resolution 2216 and other relevant UN resolutions.”
The envoy further explained that the talks will focus on five main areas; he has asked the parties to present concept papers on each of them by 3 April.
- the withdrawal of militias and armed groups
- the handover of heavy weapons to the State
- interim security arrangements
- the restoration of state institutions and the resumption of inclusive political dialogue
- the creation of a special committee for prisoners and detainees
Ahmed has said that “only a political solution and inclusive peace process will ensure a future of reconciliation and peace in the country,” but many analysts remain skeptical that the upcoming negotiations in Kuwait will accomplish any of the above goals, citing previous UN-brokered talks on Yemen that have failed to reach any agreement.
The UN envoy, however, says that there are signs of hope that this round of talks will be different, such as recent humanitarian breakthroughs in Ta’iz and successful tribal-mediated negotiations that led to a Houthi-Saudi prisoner exchange and temporary border calm earlier this month. He also added that the parties “are closer than ever [to a peace agreement] and we have the conviction that if we fail this time this is probably one of our last chances to get an end to this war.”
A video of Special Envoy Ahmed's press conference can be found here.
Air-dropped bombs in Yemen - AOAV
Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) has released a case study, researched by Iona Craig, examining the impact of air-dropped bombs on Yemen’s civilians, and the large number of casualties witnessed over the past year as a result of the Saudi-led coalition’s excessive use of these weapons in populated areas. Aerial bombings are among the most lethal forms of artillery. When compared to other manufactured explosives, they are shown to kill three times as many civilians, or an average of ten civilians per incident in the past ten years. In the first seven months of 2015, air-dropped bombs accounted for 60 percent of civilian casualties resulting from explosive violence in Yemen, with 82 percent of the 3,287 total deaths and injuries resulting from air-launched explosive weapons.
The explosive weapons with a wide impact area that AOAV investigated in Yemen were those capable of projecting blast and fragmentation effects over a particularly large radius...When a bomb, rocket, mortar or shell explodes, in a matter of microseconds a devastating shock wave has rippled out at supersonic speeds, followed by a blast wind which is channelled, muffled or magnified in unpredictable ways by the obstacles of buildings, cars and people that crowd a densely-populated area.
Thousands of bombs have been dropped on Yemen by coalition forces in the past year. Many of these explosives have struck residential areas and vehicles, schools, mosques, and markets. Even when Houthi military installations are targeted, they are often located in densely-populated areas, resulting in heavy civilian casualties and damage to schools, hospitals, and homes. These attacks have been shown to be widespread and systematic, constituting a violation by the Saudi-led coalition of international humanitarian law.
Ensuring the survival of state structures - Sana'a Center
A recent publication by the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies outlines threats to Yemen’s domestic currency and state institutions, as a result of both the year-long war and the poor policies and mismanagement that preceded the conflict. Mansour Rageh, an economist with the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) since 2003, explains that the Yemeni riyal and government institutions are critical for post-war rebuilding and that it is in all parties’ best interests (save those of IS and al-Qaeda) that they be preserved, so as to avoid the unnecessary expense of reviving them later. Considering the tremendously difficult conditions Yemen is witnessing right now, the country’s central bank and central government have done an impressive job of protecting the riyal’s value while keeping state institutions intact. However, this relative success is no longer sustainable as the ongoing conflict makes it even more difficult for the government to fulfill its debt obligations and the CBY’s foreign currency reserves are plummeting (they now stand at less than $2.1 billion, or enough to cover only two month's worth of imports). Once these reserves are exhausted, the riyal’s value will start to dip, gravely impacting the country’s entire economy and the people’s well-being.
"Many of the weaknesses in Yemen's public finances are structural and predate the current conflict. Government revenues have for some time been undiversified and overly dependant on oil exports, while expenditures have been inflated by endemic corruption and sprawling patronage networks. The current civil war – which effectively began in September 2014 and escalated when the Saudi-led military intervention began in March 2015 – has dramatically intensified these weaknesses and their consequences."
In light of these threats, Rageh suggests a number of steps to be taken to preserve the riyal and the minimum operation of state institutions. In the absence of a cessation of hostilities, which would be the largest single measure to stabilize Yemen, foreign backers of the country’s warring parties should “pressure their local allies to stop plundering state institutions and appropriating state revenue streams.” Houthis must stop selling fuel import licenses and help to reinstate the Yemen Petroleum Company as the primary handler of commercial fuel. All parties must end their respective blockades while not interfering with or targeting commercial networks across the country. Parties must also allow Yemen’s commercial banks to transfer Saudi riyals out of the country in exchange for US dollars. If these actions are taken, among others, Yemen will have a better chance of preserving the state institutions that are essential to its economy and its citizens.
Ali Mohsen "on horseback" - Khoury
Writing for the Atlantic Council, Nabeel Khoury examines President Hadi’s recent decision to name General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar as the deputy commander of Yemen’s armed forces. While this appointment is meant to be a strategic move in the battle to retake Sanʻa, Hadi’s delegation of power to Saleh’s former strong man could prove both ineffective and dangerous to Hadi’s future presidency. The hope is that Ali Mohsen will help to forge a stronger bond with tribal and southern anti-Houthi forces ahead of the critical battle to retake Sanʻa. The general, much like his former boss Saleh, once possessed all the necessary tools for political influence: corruption, smuggling networks, tribal alliances, and a loyal armed forces. Times have changed, however, and many tribes and factions across Yemen view Ali Mohsen as untrustworthy due to his questionable relations with Salafists and extremists. The ties that once boosted the general’s political stature in Yemen may now hinder his rise to power. Before the revolution, Ali Mohsen was the architect of the Saleh regime’s six-year war against the Houthis, and was seen as an agent of the forces promoting Wahhabism in northern Yemen. The resulting distrust would make post-war reconciliation an unlikely prospect.
“With his renowned Salafi leanings and attachment to a more radical Islamic political agenda than Saleh ever had, Ali Mohsen at the helm would signal a return to a past that the country’s secular youth have clearly rejected.”
The decision to appoint the general could backfire if and when Hadi’s forces, headed by Ali Mohsen, reclaim San’a. Hadi risks being overtaken by Ali Mohsen, who was once viewed as a leading contender to replace Saleh as president. But following the revolution, Ali Mohsen sided with the opposition, which failed to secure political or military power during the transitional period.
Hadi’s forces now face an uphill battle for Taʻiz and Sanʻa. The majority of Yemen’s armed forces belong to Saleh and the Houthis, and the remainder may not be sufficient to reclaim the two most important cities. Add to this the ill-advised nomination of Ali Mohsen and the result is an unlikely peace or political resolution.
Is the Houthi-Saleh Alliance Cracking? - Schwedler
A recent piece by Jillian Schwedler for the Atlantic Council explains the basis for the Houthi-Saleh alliance and its impending collapse. This marriage of convenience between historically opposed parties is not likely to outlast the ongoing war, and will possibly fall apart even earlier. A Houthi-led march in Sanʻa, which commemorated the five-year anniversary of the revolution that ended in Saleh’s forced resignation, may be the most recent indication of the alliance’s disintegration. For over a decade, and up until the 2012-14 transition period, Saleh and the Houthis butted heads. Though at first Saleh supported the Zaydi revivalist movement--seeing it as a useful counterbalance to Saudi influence in the far north, he turned on the Houthis in the early 2000s, wary of Husayn al-Houthi’s rapidly-growing power. Husayn, who was succeeded by his younger brother Abd al-Malik after his death, assembled militias in 2004 to defend the movement against the regime’s crackdown. The conflict between the Houthis and Saleh continued for years; their eventual alliance was rooted not in mutual interests but in mutual opposition to Hadi’s monopolization of the transition process.
“Between the Houthis and Saleh, there is more than enough hubris to go around. Each seems convinced it can dispense the other with ease once the Saudi-led campaign ends. But with no signs of that happening soon, will the coalition endure?”
Saleh benefits from the Houthis’ experienced militias, strong alliances with northern tribes, and their followers, who rally to their message of Zaydi (and, more generally, Yemeni) empowerment. The Houthis, meanwhile, face strong opposition and cannot survive without Saleh’s formally-trained national army and support from his patronage networks.
There is no end in sight for the ongoing conflict in Yemen, and this is putting a strain on the already uncomfortable alliance. Both parties are likely looking for ways to split from each other as soon as the dust settles. This may be more easily achieved by the Houthis. They are currently in mid-level negotiations with the Saudis, who are reportedly insistent that Saleh not be a part of Yemen’s future.
Illegal US cluster bombs are killing civilians - HRW
Human Rights Watch has documented a number of incidents of Saudi-led coalition forces in Yemen using internationally banned cluster munitions supplied by the United States, despite US prohibitions on using such weapons against civilian targets. The use of these munitions, which were recently transferred to coalition forces, is contrary to US export requirements. The weapons also appear to be failing to meet the reliability standard required by US regulations. “Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners, as well as their US supplier, are blatantly disregarding the global standard that says cluster munitions should never be used under any circumstances,” said Steve Goose, arms director at Human Rights Watch and chair of the international Cluster Munition Coalition. The use of these munitions have led to a number of civilian casualties in residential areas of Sa’dah, San’a, ‘Amran, and al-Hudaydah.
“Something hit the wall and broke through it. I immediately hit the floor. This strange object landed about five meters from me. It looked like a small silver model of a rocket. I was very afraid, I tried to crawl away and escape because I knew it could explode at any moment. It looked very scary. But as I moved, it moved with me...in slow motion it seemed. This went on for about a minute and then it exploded.”
The most recently documented incident took place on December 12, 2015 in al-Hudaydah. The cluster bombs, which were shown to have been manufactured in Wilmington, Massachusetts, injured a woman and two children in their homes.
The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of these munitions due to their tendency to leave behind large numbers of unexploded bomblets, which can pose a serious danger to civilians years--and even decades--after the end of a conflict.
Yemen, the US, and Saudi Arabia are not party to this convention. However, the use of these munitions still violates the US export law that prohibits the recipients of cluster munitions from using them in populated areas, which the Saudi-led coalition is clearly doing, and only allows the transfer of cluster munitions with a failure rate of less than 1 percent. It appears that the “Sensor Fuzed Weapons” being used in Yemen are not functioning in ways that meet this reliability standard.
In July, US Representative Jim McGovern raised concern about the use of cluster munitions, stating: “If we have evidence that countries are not complying with US law that ought to be enough to say we sell these weapons to them no more. Period. End of story.” McGovern and Human Rights Watch call for the US to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions and for the Saudi-led coalition to immediately stop using them.
Experts reflect on connections between 2011 revolution & today's war - AJE
A recent episode of Al Jazeera’s Inside Story featured human rights activist Baraa Shiban, researcher Adam Baron, and civil society activist Mohammad Al Shami, discussing the country’s failed revolution, ongoing war, and humanitarian crisis. The consensus among the three experts was that the failed transition following the 2011 revolution, which allowed former president Ali Abdullah Saleh to stay in the country, is largely to blame for the current situation in Yemen. According to Shiban, there was an underestimation in 2011 of the counter revolution and how willing Saleh was to push the country into all-out civil war. It was already clear in 2011 that Saleh would try to spoil the transition, and the GCC agreement simply delayed the conflict that Yemen is now witnessing, according to Shiban. Baron agrees that the transitional period only managed to postpone further bloodshed. “The transitional authority was incompetent and split between parties that had been at war for a year.”
The alliance forged between Saleh and the Houthis is one of convenience and survival, according to Al Shami, and the threat now posed by the Houthis to Saudi Arabia exacerbated the already deeply complex situation in Yemen as it pushed the Saudis to intervene in 2015. Baron states that the conflict in Yemen is not a proxy war as much as it is a series of inconnecting political battles. At its essence, he argues, it is locally rooted.
The incessant fighting in Yemen has taken a toll on all citizens, but Al Shami says that the younger generation is most profoundly affected as many young people are participating in the war, mostly as a way to earn money or privilege from various factions.
In order to end this war and prevent future conflicts, Shiban says that Saleh must be removed from Yemen or face sanctions. Baron notes that “unless there’s a genuine shift in how politics is done in Yemen, we’ll just see conflicts repeating in some other form.”
View the episode here (not available in all countries).
Is peace in Yemen possible? - International Crisis Group
International Crisis Group has issued a report summarizing the steps that need to be taken by all players in the war in Yemen to achieve a general ceasefire and improve the chances of a durable political settlement. Even before Saudi Arabia launched its military campaign in Yemen, the country was deeply divided: “the intervention has layered a multidimensional, thus more intractable, regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran onto an already complex civil war, significantly complicating prospects for peace.” The result is an increasingly entrenched conflict with no end in sight, according to ICG.
Each side’s commitment to UN-led peace talks is lukewarm. Neither is defeated or exhausted; both believe they can make additional military gains; and neither has been willing to make the compromises required to end the violence.
International Crisis Group makes a number of recommendations for each party to ensure a general ceasefire and a durable political settlement. These recommendations include participation by the government of Yemen, the Houthis, and Saleh’s GPC--without delay or preconditions--in UN-brokered negotiations. The Saudi-led coalition must encourage government support for the UN special envoy’s negotiating agenda and suspend military action in San’a as a show of goodwill prior to negotiations.
The UN Security Council permanent members, especially the U.S., UK, and France, must back the UN special envoy and condition the supply of weapons and ammunition to Saudi-led coalition members on their support for an immediate ceasefire and inclusive political negotiations.
Crisis Group also recommends that negotiations be expanded to include additional Yemeni stakeholders, such as the Sunni Islamist Islah party, Salafi groups, and the Southern Resistance. These negotiations should include regional security concerns and Yemen’s economic reconstruction.
Western states have failed at counterterrorism in Yemen - Saferworld
Saferworld’s new report, “Blown Back,” outlines the mistakes and lessons of the West’s counterterrorism, stabilization, and statebuilding efforts in Yemen. The report also offers recommendations on how the US and other foreign states should reconsider their regional strategies and alliances. External actors’ approaches to Yemen have had significant negative impacts due to an inability, or unwillingness, to prioritize the grievances of Yemen’s people over counterterrorism imperatives. Failure to address these grievances has led to increased popular support of the armed opposition groups that the West is working to eliminate.
Yemen’s most fundamental challenge has been the failure of a state dominated by kleptocratic elites to play a constructive role in addressing the drivers of its instability and poverty...Despairing of political processes, people have turned to group identities to seek redress for grievances, and protect their interests.
In their all-consuming efforts to fight terror, external actors have recklessly provided weapons and equipment to Yemen’s deeply divided security forces despite the high risk of military capacities being diverted from their intended purpose. Furthermore, the use of drones and other sophisticated weaponry by the West, which has killed at least 87 civilians and likely hundreds more, has merely fed anti-US sentiment and boosted recruitment by militant groups. The Saudi-led coalition’s blockade, bombardment, and ground campaign have had a similar effect.
Saferworld’s report advises that, in order to achieve its counterterrorism goals, the West must understand the driving forces behind Yemen’s many conflicts. It should revisit its objectives with a focus on peace while reconsidering its support for fundamentally illegitimate actors. Above all, Western countries need to explore every possible alternative to military attacks inside Yemen as well as demonstrate their genuine commitment to development, justice, and democratic values.
Yemen's rival parties aren't sold on peace - Farea al-Muslimi
December’s peace talks in Switzerland failed to generate a solution to the war in Yemen, a war that is driven both by regional geopolitical rivalries and by factional conflicts within Yemen itself. In an op-ed for Al Jazeera, analyst Farea al-Muslimi argues that this failure is rooted in the interest of all parties involved to remain at war. According to al-Muslimi, one of the founders of the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, Yemen “needs a dealer who can ‘redistribute the cards’ and convince the various players to invest in peace.”
The latest round of peace talks failed because many of those involved do not know what they want out of the UN-mediated process, and because they do not believe it is in their immediate interests to have peace. After nearly a year of war in Yemen, the cycle of business, economy and power now revolves around one main thing: war. Should the fighting suddenly end, many players from both sides would stand to lose.
The Houthis appear to be most comfortable on the battlefield, and if the conflict were to end, they would have to face the undesirable reality of negotiations and power sharing. Meanwhile, former president Saleh, whose agenda differs from that of the Houthis, relies on a state of war to convince those around him that he is indispensable. The Islamist militant organizations that have made notable gains in Yemen certainly have no interest in seeing an end to the conflict that has provided them with the chaos and instability that is so easy to exploit.
Hadi is also a clear loser in any successful peace process as all parties to the conflict would need him to step aside. The Saudi-led coalition, which did not make any attempts at diplomacy prior to waging war, must understand that it will not win by military means. Finally, the West cannot believably call for peace in Yemen while also profiting from weapons sales that are bringing such destruction to the country.
Houthis block food and medicine from entering Ta‘iz - HRW
Houthi forces surrounding Ta‘iz have been reportedly denying entry to aid vehicles and confiscating food and medical supplies from civilians. Human Rights Watch has documented a number of instances, some dating back to at least September, of the Houthis stopping Ta‘iz residents at checkpoints surrounding the city and confiscating fuel, food, medicine, and clothing. Medical aid trucks belonging to the World Health Organization and Médecins Sans Frontières have been turned away from Ta‘iz, preventing the delivery of essential medical supplies, such as oxygen tanks and vaccinations. These practices constitute a violation of international humanitarian law and have had grave consequences for the residents of Ta‘iz. One hospital reported that six premature infants have died in the last two months because the hospital lacks the oxygen tanks and generators necessary to run their incubators.
“The Houthis are denying necessities to residents of Ta‘iz because they happen to be living in areas that opposition forces control,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director. “Seizing property from civilians is already unlawful, but taking their food and medical supplies is simply cruel.”
Although Houthi forces surround Ta‘iz and maintain checkpoints outside of the city, opposition forces commanded by Shaykh Hamud al-Mikhlafi--including the Sunni Islah party and salafi groups--control the city center.
Ta‘iz has been subjected to indiscriminate shelling and some of the heaviest ground fighting in the conflict, forcing two-thirds of its population to flee while the remaining residents are in desperate need of food and medical aid.