Interview with Farea al-Muslimi

Episode 3 featured an excerpt from an interview we recorded last month with writer and activist Farea al-Muslimi. Because the interview contained much more valuable material than we could fit into a single segment, we decided to post the full interview here. We start off with Farea's reflections on recent visits to the embattled southern province of Abyan. After that, we discuss Farea's personal connection to the United States, and his views on US policy toward Yemen. Today, Farea became the first Yemeni to participate in a US congressional hearing on Yemen-related issues. The Senate Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights held a hearing on "The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing"; Farea joined two high-level military officers and two legal experts on the witness panel. He was by far the most impressive of the witnesses.

You can watch the entire hearing here. Farea's full written testimony, which is a moving and informative read, is here.

Farea's five-minute oral testimony is here:

Mafraj Radio Episode 3

In this episode we take our first look at the efforts of the international community in Yemen, a subject we'll come back to in several future episodes. The first segment features an interview with the UK's ambassador to Yemen, Mr. Nicholas Hopton, who summarizes for us his government's role in the country's affairs. This is followed by a chat with Ms. Kate Nevens of Saferworld, who talks about the non-governmental side of things. The episode wraps up with an excerpt from an interview with Yemeni writer and activist Farea al-Muslimi, who shares a personal perspective on US-Yemeni relations.

About our guests:

Ambassador Nicholas Hopton From the Ambassador's official bio: "Nicholas Hopton was appointed Her Majesty’s Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen in December 2011 and took up his post in January 2012. Nicholas is a career diplomat who joined the FCO in 1989 having studied at St Peter’s School, York, and Cambridge University (Magdalene College).  He has also studied at La Sapienza University in Rome and ENA in Paris. With the FCO he has served overseas in Paris, Rome, Morocco and Mauritania. He is married with five children." Read Al-Sharq al-Awsat's interview with Ambassador Hopton here. Ambassador Hopton tweets at @NicholasHopton.

Farea al-Muslimi Farea al-Muslimi is a young journalist and activist based in San'a. He has made several trips to Abyan to report from areas formerly controlled by AQAP. He wrote about some of the issues covered in this interview here. Earlier this week, he wrote about a US air strike on his own village in Dhamar Governorate.

Kate Nevens Kate Nevens directs Middle East and North Africa Program at Saferworld, a UK-based international NGO. "Kate previously worked as the manager of the MENA programme at Chatham House, an international affairs think tank based in London, with a particular focus on youth and political inclusions issues in the region and international involvement in fragile states." Kate tweets at @KateNevens.

Please note: the lack of internet access and the state of the mobile phone network in Yemen makes it difficult to record high-quality interviews with people there. Please excuse the poor sound quality; we feel that the content is well worth the auditory discomfort.

Mafraj Radio Episode 2

In the second episode of Mafraj Radio, we take a look back at the Youth Revolution of 2011 with Ibrahim Mothana, and go inside the long-awaited National Dialogue Conference with a member of the Youth delegation, Baraa Shiban. We also get an update on the situation in 'Aden from activist 'Alaa Isam.

Here's the full video of Youth delegate Mubarak al-Bahar's opening address to the National Dialogue Conference, quoted in Act 1:

Here's the Aden Live TV segment quoted in Act 2, in which the pro-Hirak satellite channel covers demonstrations and crackdowns in 'Aden.

Yemen's legacy families: between reconciliation and exclusion

Friend of the blog Fernando Carvajal reflects on a social group that is often overlooked in discussions of Yemen's political scene: families that made up the political elite in pre-unification and pre-republican Yemen. Fernando is a PhD candidate at the University of Exeter, and has studied and worked in Yemen for over a decade. As Yemenis live through phase one of the National Dialogue Conference, launched March 18, insiders and international observers work through pessimism, limited transparency, and an abundance of caution. The process itself has marginalized revolutionary elements from among the youth bulge and has failed to encourage southern participation. Added to the list of excluded groups now are various legacy families with their own historical grievances.

The process of incorporating independent youth elements to the Dialogue is much easier than observers have described. Strong young candidates have been identified by credible actors, yet a mix of hesitation by the international community and a complete refusal by traditional actors to recognize revolutionary ideas continue to marginalize those with credible grievances and street power. The more difficult issue haunting the transiton process remains the exclusion of legacy families from the north and south with grievances. The families of northern political actors affected by fifty years of intra-regime conflicts continue to struggle to find a role since the start of the 2011 uprising and now within the Dialogue process. Southern political actors, whether in Sanʻa, in the south, or abroad also find themselves struggling to fit into the process.

This year the Republic of Yemen will celebrate the fifty-first anniversary of the 26 September revolution against the Imamate of Al Hamid al-Din, and the forty-sixth anniversary of southern independence from British rule. In the north, conflict was never restricted to fighting between Royalists (supporters of the Imam) and Republicans (supported by Gammal 'Abd al-Nasser). Internal conflicts within both camps not only obstructed peace processes but also contributed to prolonged elite conflicts. The Hamid al-Din family, much of which has lived in exile since 1962, are not alone in demanding relief for their own grievances. Relatives of ousted president Abdullah al-Sallal and murdered president Ibrahim al-Hamdi are some actors among many other revolutionaries and sayyid families who believe the Dialogue must also address their concerns, as well as form part of the process bringing about a new Yemen.

In the south, contemporary politics are fixated on political actors such as ‘Ali Salem al-Baydh, ‘Ali Nasser, Haydar al-Attas, Mohammed ‘Ali Ahmed, Hassan Baʻoum and others leading the current uprising throughout southern provinces. Behind the scene there are other actors working arduously to ensure their voices are heard during the Dialogue conference or at minimum influence the process from behind closed doors. Such actors include southern sultans (al-Abdali, al-Kathiri, al-Qa’yti), tribal shaykhs and sharifs who—depending on whom you ask—were either forced to leave or left voluntarily before the establishment of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Many of them have lived in Sanʻa or elsewhere since 1967, and while not directly part of the northern regime they were never reclaimed by the southern government, nor were they accepted by southern actors during the Unification process of 1990. Since 1999 many of these actors expanded their activities to form a number of discussion forums where topics being discussed today were addressed, but never came to influence the regime in Sanʻa.

Intra-regime conflicts led to exile of revolutionary politicians and military offices in the Yemen Arab Republic, as well as numerous assassinations and ‘accidental’ deaths. In the south, those who opted to leave prior to 1967 were never allowed to reclaim their role in politics or their properties. Many of those who were pushed out in 1986 (known as Zumbra) did not have a role in the process of unification, but have been demonized for their role during the 1994 civil war as result of their support for ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh’s regime against separatists led by ‘Ali Salem al-Baydh.

Two generations in Yemen have grown up under conflicting historical narratives that have either ignored or demonized elites from both the north and the south. These ‘marginalized’ elites not only have an uphill climb vis-à-vis the current political structure, influenced by international actors and entrenched rivalries among centers of power, but also have to deal with the great distance between them and the current generation driving revolutionary ideas since February 2011. Even though youth in the north raised pictures of president al-Hamdi and revolutionary poet Mohammed Mahmoud al-Zubayri, young northern Yemenis have no connection with their progenies, and current elites have no incentive for including them. In the south, since 2009, youth only raised pictures of leaders perceived as their patrons, such as al-Baydh, and Baʻoum, the man who suffered from relentless northern harassment and oppression. This is the limited connection between the youth and the old guard in the south.

Many youth view legacy actors as merely part of the past and in no way find a role for them in the new process. The absence of trust extends beyond today’s institutions and political elites. Youth nationwide are unable to rally behind any political figure lacking potential staying power, and for any significant number of young Yemenis to eventually trust marginalized or exiled legacy elites remains very far away. The uphill battle for legacy elites will not end with exclusion from the Dialogue process. If they fail to position themselves in society once again during the transition period they may soon simply be relegated to history books written by non-Yemenis.

Mafraj Radio episode 1

Welcome to the home of the new YPP podcast, Mafraj Radio! Our podcast will cover contemporary political, social, and cultural affairs in Yemen and the Yemeni diaspora from a range of sources and perspectives. Our aim with this podcast is to make Yemen accessible to casual listeners who don’t necessarily have a background in Yemen or Middle East studies, while still providing a level of depth and context you can’t get from mainstream media coverage of Yemen. On this episode, we take a look at two growing movements that are threatening the established political and social order in Yemen: the Peaceful Southern Movement, also known as al-Hirak, and the Huthi movement.

Our guests on this episode are:

Adam M. Baron is a freelance journalist based in Sanaa, Yemen who reports regularly for the Daily Telegraph, McClatchy Newspapers and the Christian Science Monitor. His writing has also appeared in Foreign Policy, The Nation (US), The Daily Beast, The Economist, The Independent (UK), Brownbook, Vice and Sports Illustrated. He has been interviewed by radio and television outlets in the United States, Canada and Europe, including CBS Radio, ABC Radio, CNN, the CBC, NPR, RTE and various arms of the BBC.

Born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland, he graduated from Williams College with a dual degree in Arab Studies and Religion. He has lived in Sanaa since January 2011.

You can follow Adam on Twitter: @adammbaron

Stephen W. Day Stephen Day is Adjunct Professor of Middle East Politics at the Hamilton Hold School at Rollins College in Florida (USA). He has written for many journals, including Middle East Journal, Middle East Policy, and publications of the Carnegie Foundation. His latest book, Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: a troubled national union, is published by Cambridge Press.

Madeleine Wells Goldburt is a 2013 visiting research fellow at the AUK and a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the George Washington University, where she concentrates on comparative politics, ethnic politics, and international relations. Her dissertation research focuses on the politics of citizenship and social benefits in the Arabian Gulf. Prior to attending GWU, Ms. Wells worked for two years at the RAND Corporation analyzing rebellion and insurgency in Arabian Gulf and Horn of Africa. She also assisted with research for the Military Leadership Diversity Commission. Ms. Wells is a co-author of the 2010 RAND monograph Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon. She holds an MA in Islamic Studies from Columbia and a BA in Government and Near Eastern Studies from Cornell.

You can follow Madeleine on Twitter: @SwellWells

For a brief but excellent history of the Peaceful Southern Movement (al-Hirak), I recommend that you read these two posts by Yemeni blogger Sama'a al-Hamdani: Part 1, Part 2

The video for the song Dana mentions at the end of act one can be found here:

A note about this episode: we make a serious effort to include Yemeni voices in each episode, but in this case it was not possible to record interviews with any of the three other guests we had planned to speak to before our deadline.

An 'Aden Emergency

Throughout the day yesterday the news from 'Aden got worse and worse. Security forces raided private homes and arrested two prominent Hirak activists. Police fired on demonstrators in Khormaksar. Tensions were growing ahead of planned demonstrations by Islahis celebrating the anniversary of president Hadi's "election" and Hirakis denouncing it. Finally, security forces fired on a convoy of Hirakis from Abyan and Shabwah that included Hirak leader Hassan Ba 'Oum. This last event, and the subsequent arrival in 'Aden of said convoy of now-enraged separatists, seems to have been the turning point; certain members of the Technical Committee for the National Dialogue Conference withdrew from the committee, and its chairman, Dr. al-Iryani, suspended the committee and asked the president for a urgent meeting, according to reports. Meanwhile, residents and militants in Dhale‘, near the old north-south border, have been preparing for another round of war with government forces. Farther east, youths in al-Mukalla threw stones at and attacked the shops of northern merchants.

Few of these events are totally new, but this week there seems to be something in the air. According to some sources, last week's Security Council resolution, which named 'Ali al-Beidh as a spoiler of the transition right alongside 'Ali Saleh, angered southerners and gave al-Beidh's popularity a major boost. Some Hirakis seem intent on forcing a confrontation, while increased brutality on the part of the state seems to be pushing the various rival factions of al-Hirak together. Moreover it feels, to me at least, that there is a fixed point looming ahead and near at hand. Of course the planned start date of the NDC is less than a month away, but no one really expects it to start on time (nevertheless, people realize that it can't be put off indefinitely). There's something bigger, some reason which to me feels like a law of nature, that makes a much larger and more dire state of conflict in the south seem inevitable. Again, I can't really support this with facts, and maybe tomorrow will feel different. There were similar days and feelings during the height of the protest in 2011, like the next day would bring something big, something terrible, but nothing came of it.

What I can say for sure is this: things aren't getting better in the south, and no one in 'Aden or San‘a has anything close to a workable plan for how to make them better. The international community has virtually ignored the southern issue, willing it to go away on its own. Besides, everyone from Ban Ki-Moon to Barack Obama to Vladimir Putin has made it clear that if the world is going to solve a civil war this year, it's going to have to be Syria's. As far as the world is concerned, war in Yemen is not an option. So if the worst happens, Yemenis will be on their own.

What would a real civil war look like today? Very little like the war of 1994, which ended with clear victory for northern forces and the Saleh regime. Not like the insurrection against the British in the 1960s, either. In the former, Saleh had three-fourths of a regular army, plus tribal allies and Jihadi irregulars to enforce his will. In the latter, the British, though ultimately defeated, had the supply lines and wealth of a empire. President Hadi has an empty treasury, a divided military, and is, politically speaking, surrounded by jackals.

The southern side would also look very different than it did in 1994. Though Hiraki militias have grown to be quite organized (in theory, anyway) in certain places, that is not the case everywhere. But if war breaks out in 'Aden, the real question will be how all of the other armed factions in Yemen respond. How will AQAP get involved? What will Ahmad 'Ali Saleh and his cousin Yahya do? What will 'Ali Muhsin do? The Huthis? The tribes surrounding San‘a that were so brutally punished during 2011?

Bottom line: if Aden breaks into open armed rebellion, the rest of the south is likely to as well. If that happens, armed groups throughout Yemen--including elements of the military--will take advantage of the situation. A civil war in today's Yemen could fracture the nation in a dozen ways. It's impossible to predict who would come out on top, but the southern people and Hadi's government would be sure losers.

It's morning in 'Aden now, and heavy, continuous gunfire is reported in Khormaksar District and Sirah/Crater as well. More violence is certain; little else is.

President Obama, take two

This week began with the second inauguration of Barack Obama here in the US, and with a series of air strikes--likely carried out by American drones--in Yemen. In fact, there have been six or seven strikes within the last week, though the exact number of resultant casualties is unknown. Along with these "kinetic" events, recent weeks have featured another kind of activity from President Obama. Mr. Obama has announced his nominations for CIA Director and Secretary of Defense. If things go according to plan, John O. Brennan--who has been Obama's chief counter-terrorism advisor and is generally thought to be the most important man in Washington for Yemen policy--will take over the CIA, and Chuck Hagel will head to the Pentagon. Obama's nominee for Secretary of State, John Kerry, breezed through confirmation hearings yesteday. Mr. Kerry said during his hearings that he wants to see a demilitarization of US foreign policy, that "we cannot afford a diplomacy that is defined by troops or drones or confrontation." I couldn't agree more, as any reader of this blog knows. I wish Mr. Kerry the best, and I do expect that he'll try to redirect this country's foreign policy priorities to some extent. But it'll be an uphill battle, especially when it comes to Yemen. Within his own department, the rising trend of the fortress embassy (exemplified by the growing "Green Zone" around the embassy in San‘a) is a major hindrance to this objective. And Kerry will have to claw back control of the Yemen portfolio from the NSC, DoD, and CIA , if he even wants it. While I'd love to see him really shake things up at State, I don't know that Kerry is willing to take the kind of risks that might disqualify him from higher office in the future.

Gregory Johnsen and Micah Zenko, among others, have made the case against John Brennan as CIA director (and indeed, against John Brennan as decent human being), based in large part on his handling of America's war in Yemen. There are others who argue in Brennan's favor. Some say he has worked within the president's CT team to limit the use of targeted killings, and that he will work to demilitarize the CIA. Joshua Foust gives Brennan the benefit of the doubt on that issue and explains the choices Brennan will face at CIA in this brief piece.

Chuck Hagel will be, if confirmed, the first former enlisted soldier to serve as Secretary of Defense. As a young man at war in Vietnam, he was wounded and decorated multiple times. Critics in congress see Hagel as not hawkish enough to lead the country's military. Hagel himself says that he is not a pacifist, but will do anything in his power to avoid involving America in a new ground war. This conviction sounds like a pretty good fit with Obama's idea of war; this administration favors a "small footprint" in foreign operations, hence the focus on air power and cooperation with local forces in Yemen.

It's doubtful that any of these men will push the Obama Administration toward any major changes in its policy toward Yemen if status quo is what the president has in mind. It is possible, however, that Mr. Obama himself is interested in trying a new strategy in Yemen and elsewhere.  His administration is notoriously opaque, so if he and his team are planning to significantly change their approach to certain foreign policy challenges, the public shouldn't expect to hear it from the president until such plans have been implemented and appear to be bearing fruit.

The Life March - a recollection

Yesterday marked the one-year anniversary of the Life March, one of the biggest actions of the 2011 revolution. On December 20 of 2011, hundreds of revolutionaries left Freedom Square in Ta‘iz and marched north through several governorates. They ended their march--having picked up reinforcements along the way--in San‘a's Change Square, where they were received as heroes. Before that, however, the marchers lost a number of martyrs to Yemeni security forces. To commemorate this inspiring act of protest, we are very happy to be able to publish a short book, written by Dr. Olfat Addoba'ee, a young academic and activist from Ta‘iz. Dana Moss and I met Dr. Olfat, along with dozens of other Ta‘izi revolutionaries, in Freedom Square in June. It is with our deepest appreciation for her dedication to Yemen and for her friendship that we share her memoirs with our readers here.

No end in sight for Huthi-Islah conflict

Friend-of-the-blog Fernando Carvajal gives us his take on the ongoing conflict between the Huthi movement and the Islah party. Fernando is a PhD candidate at University of Exeter (UK). He currently resides in Sanʻa.  After two years of a volatile cease fire between Zaydi rebels and government forces, and a year after Yemeni president ʻAli ʻAbdullah Saleh agreed to step down, the threat of all-out war still looms in northern Yemen. Tensions remain high in three provinces surrounding the Huthi stronghold Saʻdah, not to mention the capital Sanʻa.

Most attention in recent weeks has focused on the delayed National Dialogue, which is mandated by the GCC Initiative to help unify the various conflictive regions. While not much is reported of the increasing tensions between particularly the Huthis—a rebel group in control of territory in northern Yemen—and the Islah party, which has grown more powerful in the course of the Arab Spring. This conflict between a Zaydi (Shiʻah) group and a Sunni political party, composed of Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi elements, has been downplayed as a mere political conflict, not a sectarian one. Yet, as tensions increase as a result of both armed conflicts in northern provinces and Islah’s increasing political domination of the transition government, political rhetoric has focused on public attacks with religious underpinnings.

Milestones of conflict

Analysis refrains from calling armed conflicts in 2011 a civil war, even though the same conflicts existed between the same parties in the same areas prior to the popular uprisings of the Arab Spring. While the six wars fought between 2004 and 2009 involved direct conflict between Huthis and government forces, since 2011 clashes have [maily] involved armed militias. This new level of conflict produced a new dynamic whereby the state, in this case represented by transition president ‘Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi, is unable to directly control the conflict. As a result, analysts have gauged the potential for expanded armed conflict based on perceived degrees of escalation.

As religious holidays, such as ‘Eid al-Adha or ‘Eid al-Ghadir, came to an end peacefully, fears of potential sparks for all-out conflict began to diminish. Analysts continue to forecast the potential for a civil war, however, rising from a number of small, sustained skirmishes in cities and villages in northern provinces like ‘Amran, Hajjah, and al-Jawf. At the start of the Islamic holiday ‘Eid al-Adha (25 October) many expected Huthi and Islahi militias to take advantage of the security forces’ low guard to expand their physical presence around the capital Sanʻa and other areas. Yet, no major incidents were reported, and Zaydi celebrations of Eid al-Ghadir in Sanʻa remained peaceful.

In late October, a suspected US drone killed three al-Qa‘idah in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operatives in a camp along the Saʻdah/al-Jawf border. Both of these provinces are under Huthi influence, leading Huthis to warn both the Hadi government and the US of grave consequences if Huthis were targeted in a similar manner. Yet, this rebel group has been accused of cooperating with the US against AQAP.

On November 11, 2012 Huthi rebels agreed to sign a de-escalation agreement with the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) at the home of Dr. Yasin Saʻid Noman, Secretary-General of the Yemeni Socialist Party. Since the JMP is led by al-Islah party as senior partner, this was hailed as a major achievement. But the agreement focused on ending media attacks, and was not a cease-fire between Islah and Huthis. This was evident when within a few days of signing the agreement clashes were once again reported in al-Shabwan, al-Jawf Province.

Convenient Alliances

The tension between the two groups is far from cooling. No efforts have been made to engage in a dialogue between the two religious forces, and this serves continued political posturing. Instead various  alliances of convenience are formed, which represent efforts to counter Islah’s rise since the signing of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative on 23 November 2011. Such shifting alliances are too often neglected in analysis.

The new political environment has brought old foes together. Huthi expansion into southern provinces, and funding from Iran for exiled southern leaders such as Ali Salem al-Baydh has created strange bedfellows. Huthi and Southern Movement (Hirak) elements have joined forces to counter their common foe Islah in places like the port city of ‘Aden. And, although Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi, the first leader of the Huthi rebels, raised arms in 2004 against the government of former president ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh, the deposed president is said to have opened channels with Husayn’s brother and successor, ‘Abd al-Malik al-Huthi.

Sources in Sanʻa indicate former president Saleh has met Huthi representatives such as Saleh Habrah, Saleh al-Wijman, Yusef al-Madani and others. People close to actors in Beirut point to meetings between Yemeni politicians and Abu Mustafa of Hezbollah and diplomat ‘Ali al-Hajj. Media outlets in Sanʻa affiliated with the General People’s Congress (GPC), headed by ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh, have also refrained from attacking the Southern Movement since the summer, giving an impression of an unofficial agreement. Hirak have also refrained from slogans against the ‘Zaydi Occupiers,’ which have previously been used since 2007. Islah has attempted to co-opt the Southern Movement through its own southern organizations, led by Nabil Ghanem. But the memories of Islah’s role against current leaders of Hirak in the 1994 civil war, still form an important part of the Southern narrative.

In a conversation with ‘Ali al-Emad, spokesman of ‘Abd al-Malik al-Huthi in Sanʻa, details were provided as to the gap between propaganda and the Huthi’s political aims. Al-Emad admitted to effective political expansion by his group beyond Saʻdah, crediting political gains among young Yemenis, who may not be Zaydis or Shiʻah themselves. Al-Emad also insists that “Hirak trusts the Huthis,” and while he did not completely deny possible financial support from Iran for the movement, he questioned the bias implicit in this question, as it is well known that Saudi Arabia supports Islah [and the GPC, among others].

During our conversation, ‘Ali al-Emad commented on the role of the US Embassy during the transition. While he does not expect US Ambassador Gerald Feierstein to visit Saʻdah any time soon, he denied any Huthi role in the 13 September attack on the embassy in Sanʻa. Recalling the fact that the Huthis did not sign the GCC Initiative, al-Emad points to their willingness to participate in the National Dialogue through the role played by Muhammad al-Bukhaity and Dr. Ahmad Sharaf al-Din. He pointed to good relations with the European Union, having hosted a European delegation to Saʻdah accompanying Dr. Yasin Saʻid Noman earlier this year.

Conclusion

While low-level confrontations with Islah do not yet amount to a sectarian war, the attack on a Huthi celebration of Ashoura on 24 November in Sanʻa may be a new level of escalation. It also still remains to be seen if alliances of convenience will hold over time as political positioning continues in the absence of a National Dialogue conference. The cohesiveness of the Huthi group may also suffer from internal vulnerabilities as time passes. ‘Abd al-Malik’s leadership is constantly challenged by his cousin Muhammad ‘Abd al-Thim al-Huthi, considered more of a religious leader. As a result of increasing confrontations with Islah and Salafi elements, and in the absence of direct dialogue toward a permanent cease-fire, time will have more of a negative affect for efforts to achieve comprehensive reconciliation, particularly in northern provinces.

Hadi and his "friends," part II

Recently the online journal Muftah invited me to write something about Yemen, so I decided to use the opportunity to follow up on my last blog post with another look at the relationship between Yemen and its international backers. In this piece I examine the international community's apparent disconnect from reality and  how the Friends of Yemen's focus on largely irrelevant technical goals is harming Yemen's chances of a successful transition. Read my op-ed here.

Hadi and his "friends," part I

This was a big week for President Hadi. The annual UN General Assembly general debate was his first big-time outing as a head of state; his first official visit to the White House as president came yesterday (he met with VP Joe Biden and John Brennan); he co-chaired the Friends of Yemen meeting at the UN; and in his absence, Yemen celebrated the 50th anniversary of the 1962 revolution, which established the Yemen Arab Republic. I would like to say it was a good week, and that President Hadi represented Yemen well. I would really like to say that, but I won't. In my opinion, Hadi did a poor job of representing the interests of the Yemeni people, and failed to set appropriate and useful priorities for international involvement in Yemen.

This afternoon President Hadi spoke at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC. Rather than re-hash the speech and question-and-answer session, I'll let you read my tweets (and a few by analyst Katherine Zimmerman) about it. You can also watch the video here.

I was seriously disappointed by Hadi's performance today, but I think I understand what he was trying to do, and it's important to understand. When foreign leaders come to the US, they generally come to ask for something. The smart ones know that the best way to plead their case is to stay "on-message" at all times. By focusing on security and counter-terrorism, Hadi was telling his American backers what he believes they want to hear. In fact, I think his comments told us a good deal more about American priorities and interests than we ever learn from listening to US officials.

US State Department officials, along with President Obama's counter-terrorism advisor John Brennan, have insisted that the US approach to Yemen's multitude of problems is "comprehensive," and have even tried to convince us that the humanitarian situation in Yemen is America's foremost concern. Yet President Hadi did not once use the word "humanitarian" in his remarks. He said nothing about the critical food insecurity that faces 45% of his countrymen, or the water shortage that threatens the entire country's future, or the lack of health services that is costing hundreds of lives throughout Yemen. He focused entirely on security threats, mainly the threat posed by AQAP, but also the nefarious actions of Iran, just in case American audiences are bored with al-Qa‘idah. Even the economic crisis was phrased as a security threat. Hadi repeatedly brought up Yemen's high unemployment figures, but suggested that the reason to worry about unemployment is that it leaves young people vulnerable to recruitment by terrorists.

The take-away is that, no matter what John Brennan and his buddies tell us, the president of Yemen firmly believes that security and counter-terrorism are America's only concerns in Yemen, and the only causes that will draw American (financial) assistance. And if that's what President Hadi believes--after a week of meeting with high-level US and international officials--I think we should take his word for it.

Of course it's no news flash that the Obama administration prioritizes these things; we and most other observers have been saying that for ages. But it is very important to understand that Hadi feels his relationship with outside powers is limited to these issues. The pressure he's getting from the US (and other allies as well) is defining his presidency, and it may very well cost him what legitimacy he has in the eyes of the Yemeni people.

One final note: the part of Hadi's remarks that has garnered the most attention thus far is the brief segment of the Q&A session in which he talked about American drones. Foreign Policy has already rushed out what I think is a misleading and sensationalist blog post saying that Hadi "expressed unwavering support for the controversial CIA drone program in his country." This is simply not true. Hadi praised the US for sharing information in the fight for Abyan, and he praised drones for their "pinpoint precision." He admitted that the Yemeni air force can't carry out nighttime operations, and that drones do things his forces can't. (I don't think this made anyone at the White House very happy, since Obama's people never acknowledge drone strikes in Yemen or elsewhere, and have encouraged Hadi and his predecessor to take "credit" for American strikes in the past.) But at no point did he say a single word about US drone policy, or about the CIA and US military programs that operate drones in Yemen. It should also be said that his answers were all very poorly prepared and delivered in a rambling fashion that at times bordered on non-nonsensical.

I understand that many people, including many Yemenis, will interpret Hadi's rather off-the-cuff comments on drones as "unwavering support" for lethal American operations in Yemen, just as Foreign Policy has done (and this goes to the heart of what I said above concerning Hadi's legitimacy). But I think the record should show what the man said, as well as what everyone else said about what he said.

If anything, the fact that Hadi said what he said should demonstrate how out of sync he is with Washington. The first rule of Obama's drone policy has always been "try not to talk about drone policy," and when that fails, it's "absolutely don't ever take responsibility for specific actions." Now President Hadi has gone in front of the whole world and said that any time someone gets blown up after dark in Yemen, the Americans did it. This is hardly a man in lockstep with the US administration.

UPDATE 9/29/2012: Today Foreign Policy Managing Editor Blake Hounshell has published his notes from an interview he conducted with Hadi yesterday. In the interview, Hadi "confirmed that he personally signs off on all drone strikes conducted by his American ally." In my book, that counts as an endorsement of US drone policy, even if the stuff he said during the Wilson Center Q&A didn't. I seriously doubt the statement is true, but if that's what he wants people to think, then he'll have a hard time avoiding blame for all future civilian casualties in Yemen.

Talking about the south

Earlier today someone commented on the YPP Facebook page that the YPP isn't doing anything to highlight or address the "southern issue." I think this is not quite true, but I thought I'd take a minute to write about the subject in the hopes of fostering a public discussion here on the blog. First, what exactly is the "southern issue"? It depends who you ask. If you ask a representative of the central government, for instance, he might tell you about the "lawlessness" and violence that pervades some parts of the south, and the refusal of southern activists and political leaders to participate in the transition process.

If you ask your average southerner, she or he will probably tell you that southerners have been systematically disenfranchised ever since unification in 1990, and that a peaceful protest movement that began in 2007 has been violently repressed since its very first sit-in. He or she would probably also mention the 1994 civil war, in which northern forces destroyed the southern army and sacked the southern capital, 'Aden, and other cities. Many southerners will also say that the south has been "occupied" ever since 1994, and that the Saleh regime and its inner circle of northern shaykhs, generals, and businessmen systematically stole southern land and wealth in the early years of unification. An increasing number of southerns will go on to tell you that they are, in fact, not Yemenis at all. They prefer to be called South Yemenis or South Arabians, and they demand complete independence for the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

If you were to ask me about the southern issue, I'd probably mention some of the same things as our hypothetical southerner above. I'd tell you that the government's response to southern activism since 2007 has been excessively violent and militarized. I would note that, in today's transitional, post-revolutionary Yemen, government forces would hardly dare to attack protesters in San‘a or Ta‘iz (although some government agencies still hold political prisoners from the revolution), but those same forces don't hesitate to bully, beat, or fire upon demonstrators in the south. I would also mention that although both the new president and prime minister are from the south, the current central government has done nothing to demonstrate good faith or otherwise address the demands of southerners in a constructive fashion.

But there's more to the issue than just a conflict between north and south, or between pro-independence activists and the central government. Southern secessionists are divided among themselves. There are several different political leaders who claim to speak for the south (or specific parts of the south), and even more ground-level factions that mount demonstrations and even armed attacks on government assets. And of course, there are plenty of southerners who aren't asking for independence. Some support the idea of a federal state with strong local government, and others want to see southern grievances addressed in the context of a new, unified, revolutionary republic. And yes, there are southerners who support neither independence nor the revolution (not a popular thing to say, but it's certainly true).

Personally, I believe that self-determination is an inalienable right for all people. That said, if the southern governorates were to declare independence today, the results would not be good for anyone in Yemen (except the arms dealers). I think some kind of progress on the nation-wide transition and stabilization process must be achieved before any serious talk about dividing Yemen into smaller states. I think a successful, peaceful, equal southern Yemen--independent or not--can only come about if the various factions and political leaders of the southern region can find a way to work together under a democratic framework (something they've never managed to do before, it must be said.

Now that I've said my piece, I very much want to hear what other people have to say. How do you see the "southern issue"? What do you think the government can do about it? What do you think about independence or federalism, and do you think either of these things is actually feasible? How can northern citizens help create a more positive political atmosphere? What should outside powers and the international community be doing with regards to the south? What should non-governmental organizations and foreign activists like us be doing? Please let us hear your opinions. Thanks!

A "comprehensive" approach

Today I and many other Yemeni and Yemen-watching Tweeters spent a chunk of our day watching and critiquing John Brennan's speech and Q&A session at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. Brennan is President Obama's chief counter-terrorism advisor, and seen by many as the man in charge of the Yemen portfolio, though of course that file officially resides with the Department of State. Brennan's speech was rather short, and not very informative. He outlined what he claims is America's multi-faceted, "comprehensive" approach to Yemen's current "challenges," and stressed that so-called kinetic counter-terrorism (i.e. killing people) is only the last of several pillars of American policy in Yemen. Mr. Brennan has been saying the same thing for more than two years, as have officials at the State Department. At the same time, a number of other government officials have admitted (usually off the record or anonymously) that the Obama administration is, in fact, only concerned with dealing with AQAP, and views Yemen solely through the counter-terrorism lens.

I've long said that the State Department's plan for Yemen looks good on paper. That was true before the revolution, and it's still somewhat true. But anyone who is honest about it can tell you that what's on paper is not what's going on on the ground. Even the most well-intended policies are worthless if they cannot be implemented. More importantly, the Yemeni people no longer believe a word of what Brennan and his colleagues have to say. I almost choked when Brennan said the following (quoted also by Gregory Johnsen):

"Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we see little evidence that these actions are generating widespread anti-American sentiment or recruits of AQAP."

Well, Mr. Brennan, there's a reason why that wisdom is conventional. I have no idea--literally none--how Brennan arrived at his conclusion. There has, to my knowledge, been no polling done on the subject recently. Mr. Brennan doesn't talk to ordinary Yemenis when he goes over there, and neither do the embassy staff. But I do, and I can tell you that Yemeni public opinion about America and American policies has never been lower than is is right now. Go ask a Yemeni if you don't believe me. Yemenis I've talked to recently about this topic include intellectuals, activists, western-educated scholars, shop-keepers, bus drivers, students, and unemployed college graduates. They all believe that US CT efforts are killing innocent civilians on a regular basis, that the US has never stopped supporting 'Ali Saleh, and that John Brennan and Ambassador Feierstein are essentially operating as imperial viceroys of the country. What's more, most of the Yemenis I've talked to believe wholeheartedly that the ill consequences of US policy are completely intended, and that the US is driving the total mess that passes for a transition in post-revolutionary Yemen.

Now, it's my belief that most of the negative consequences of US policy are unintended, but this doesn't mean they're unpredictable. The Obama administration knows the following things: 1) much of the Yemeni public, especially the revolutionary factions, despise Ambassador Feierstein, and think that he's far too close to 'Ali Saleh; 2) targeted killings and other violent operations alienate local populations; 3) the mere presence of American armed forces in a country often alienate local populations; 4) the United States has neither the capability nor the political will to serve as midwife for Yemen's transition; 5) AQAP has gotten stronger* and has diversified its operations since Obama began his kinetic campaign against them in 2009 (Brennan denied that US operations are driving AQAP recruitment, but he also said that outside of the hundreds of hardcore AQAP operatives in Yemen, there are now "thousands" of non-members who the organization can rally to arms in certain situations. This may be more a result of San'a's policies than of Washington's, but the correlation shouldn't be dismissed). I could go on.

Knowing those five things (and many more), the administration must understand that its Yemen policy, in its current form, will result in neither the defeat of AQAP nor the stabilization of Yemen's political situation. But the administration also knows that it's under very little domestic pressure to change these policies. Today's CFR event, which was billed as solely Yemen-centric, featured more questions about Syria, cyber-security, and other random crap than about Yemen. And that's at a venue that draws some of Washington's most well-informed foreign policy buffs. So the administration knows that the domestic audience doesn't care what it does in Yemen, so long as there are no more AQAP-initiated attacks on the "homeland."

In the light of those observations, we can more easily read the subtext of Brennan's rhetoric. Part of that subtext is that there is a serious lack of critical, creative thinking going on in the foreign policy wing of the Obama administration. Its treatment of Yemen and of the other "Arab Spring" countries has been predictable and extremely sloppy. Obama's team is fudging its way through the Yemeni "transition" and the war against AQAP because it doesn't have a better idea and doesn't have the energy to come up with one.

The other part of that subtext is a method of management that has become a hallmark of Obama's foreign policy and CT: the method of keeping all high-level decision processes behind closed doors, while assuring the public, the media, and the legislature that these processes are being handled with the utmost sensitivity. Every question is met with the condescending promise that "we're taking care of it, just don't ask us how."

Only if this extreme opacity around the policy-making process is reversed can we hope to see any measure of change in the policies themselves. This being an election year, we can, I suppose, hope that such change is on the horizon. It's much more likely, in the absence of any real pressure, that Brennan's next Yemen speech will be a near-verbatim replay of this one. In the meantime, let's hope the audience comes up with better questions.

*Some would argue that while AQAP has become stronger in some respects, it has been weakened in others, particularly in terms of its ability to launch attacks outside of Yemen. This is an argument that is very difficult to prove, as such operations have always been rare and sporadic.

Ramadan Karim

With Ramadan upon us, the YPP has launched its second annual Fast for Yemen campaign to raise funds for direct relief efforts and YPP operations. Last year, in the midst of Yemen's popular revolution, we used our Ramadan campaign to raise money for the field hospitals in Change Square in San‘a and Freedom Square in Ta‘iz, and for IDP camps in Khormaksar, ‘Aden. I don't recall exactly how much we brought in during the holy month, but between March and the end of 2011 we raised about $10,000 for those three causes from supporters all around the globe. It's not a lot by the standards of big-time NGOs, who can't do anything without several million dollars. But by delivering 100% of the cash raised directly to the hospitals and camps, we were able to make a real difference. More importantly, our efforts sent a message to our friends in Yemen, that someone out there in the wider world was paying attention, that they were not alone. Though some progress has been made in the political arena since then, Yemen's massive humanitarian crisis has only grown. Today a record number of Yemenis face hunger or food insecurity. According to Oxfam, "some 10 million people – 44 percent of the population of Yemen – do not have enough food to eat. The UN estimates that 267,000 Yemeni children are facing life threatening levels of malnutrition." Take a moment to read that quote again. 44%.

This year we've decided to partner with a new, Yemeni-run organization, Hemmat Shabab. Hemmat Shabab's mission is to train and empower Yemenis to make a difference in their own communities, and to develop grass-roots, Yemeni solutions to Yemen's problems. Last month they launched their Ramadan food collection drive at an event hosted by Prime Minister Basundwah. Hemmat will follow their Ramadan campaign by opening Yemen's first public food banks. Food banks are a particularly effective tool in combating Yemen's current hunger crisis, because much of the problem stems from a crisis of affordability. That is, there is food in the markets, but many Yemenis can't afford to buy it. Many families have to choose between food and other necessities, like fuel, medicine, or water. In a recent article, Iona Craig tells of a village near Yemen's Red Sea coast that has had to abandon subsistence farming because they can't afford fuel to run their irrigation pumps. Food banks, along with cash transfers (as implemented by Oxfam and other large NGOs) and other means of direct assistance, significantly ease the burden on families and allow them to budget for other necessities.

In the first 24 hours of our campaign we've raised over $600. By the end of Ramadan we hope to have raised at least $3,000. I hope you'll join us this year in Fasting for Yemen, and I wish all the readers of this blog a blessed Ramadan.

US foreign policy and Yemen's tenuous transition - Los Angeles, CA, 7/22

  On Sunday, July 22, YPP director Will Picard will lead a public forum on Yemen and American foreign policy. The event is part of the Progressive Conversations series and is hosted by the Levantine Cultural Center.

The event is open to the public; a $5 donation is recommended. Seating is limited, so please call the Levantine Cultural Center to RSVP at (323) 413-2001.

More info available here.

Two big questions

While I work on a couple of long, detailed blog posts—one on the tactics and messaging strategies of AQAP and Ansar al-Shari`ah, and one on why President Hadi might want to take a page out of his predecessor's playbook—I needed to take a minute and flesh out two questions that keep coming up in my interactions on Twitter, but are too big to easily tackle in that format. I don't have answers to either of these questions, so I would love it if readers would offer their thoughts, either here in the comments or on Twitter.

Big Question Number One:

AQAP and Ansar al-Shari`ah: are they one and the same? Most serious analysts and specialists who know a lot about Yemen and/or al-Qa`idah believe that they are. More specifically, they accept the explanation that AQAP itself has offered, that Ansar al-Shari`ah (AAS) is simply a new brand name that AQAP operatives use when they think the al-Qa`idah name might not go over well with locals. This is the interpretation Gregory Johnsen, Aaron Zelin, and Will McCants—three very smart analysts I tend to agree with—accept, and it's the one presented on last week's PBS Frontline special. That program reached a much broader audience than usually pays attention to news from Yemen.

But there are others who don't accept this easy explanation of the relationship between AAS and AQAP. Wall Street Journal correspondent Ellen Knickmeyer has been very vocal, on Twitter at least, in insisting that locals in Abyan view the two organizations as separate and distinct. Knickmeyer claims that "a sizeable number of researchers currently working in Yemen" understand the two to be distinct, although she became inexplicably hostile and refused to talk to me when I tried to discuss this with her on Twitter. Another San`a-based American analyst whom I respect a great deal told me recently that AQAP's leadership has no direct relationship to AAS, and that AAS was originally, according to his sources, made up primarily of mercenaries, though it's not clear exactly to whom they answered.

The two groups still maintain separate media operations. As I'll explain in more detail in an upcoming post, I think that the messaging and media of the two groups tells us a good deal about their relationship. Most importantly, no one in the "AAS and AQAP are the same" camp has yet presented a detailed explanation of the whole operational structure of the unified organization. If AAS is just a marketing campaign, we have to understand how AQAP has been able, in just one year, to transform from a rather small network of militants primarily focused on carrying out bombings and other small operations to a quasi-state entity, capable of commanding a small army and governing whole towns.

Big Question Number Two:

Who really controls armed groups associated with Islah and the Southern Movement in 'Aden and elsewhere in the south? A few minutes ago I had the following interaction with Tweeter Haykal Bafana` after tweeting a story from the Yemen Post about new recruits in the Yemeni army firing at the Defense Minister's car:

[View the story "New Story" on Storify]

This conversation reminded me of another one I had last week with tweeter Amel Ahmed about recent fighting between armed men identified as members of the Southern Movement (al-Hirak) and others identified as Islahi gunmen. Now, it's commonly understood that al-Hirak is not a unitary group with a single, central leadership. So it's very hard to know whom we're talking about when we use phrases like "Hiraki gunmen" or "southern separatist fighters." A recent story in the Guardian explained how some Southern Movement factions are seeking support from/being courted by foreign powers or other factions, including Iran and AQAP. So it's always important to ask, when clashes involving "separatists" are reported in 'Aden, Hadhramawt, or elsewhere in the south, who exactly these separatists are, and who commands, supports, or arms them.

Likewise, it's not clear (at least to me) who the so-called Islah party gunmen are in 'Aden (or in Abyan, as per Haykal's assertion above). Most analysts will tell you that party membership has never been the primary mode of identification, or the primary loyalty, of most Yemenis. Party ranks below family and tribe for most people. But in the past year there have been fighters described as "Islahi" involved in conflicts in al-Jawf, San`a, Arhab, `Aden, and now Abyan. So who are these fighters, and who commands them? Should we assume that all of these groups are in fact commanded and paid by the Islah party leadership? Of course, Islah has never been a perfectly unified entity either, so who among the leading figures in the party is responsible for these militias? Hamid al-Ahmar? 'Abd al-Majid al-Zindani?

As armed groups continue to proliferate throughout Yemen, and as the United States becomes increasingly involved in the Yemeni state's fights against some of these groups, those of us who seek to understand Yemeni affairs need to do a better job of understanding and explaining the issues raised above.

*********** Update: The first response to this post came via Twitter. I can't post Storify pieces in the comments section, so I'll add it here:

[View the story "New Story" on Storify]

Military restructuring: unraveling a tangled web

Since 2011 the international community has feared a total breakdown of the Yemeni military establishment, fragmenting the armed forces to a degree where major conflict would erupt leading to a civil war. This scenario developed in April after a number of government officials defected from the government on March 21, 2011 and declared their protection of civilian protesters. Beginning in April, Yemenwitnessed a number of proxy battles between government supporters and armed militias ʻAligned to Gen. ʻAli Muhsin and the al-Islah party. This fear of total fragmentation then led to the initial GCC-led initiative for political transition in April. The back and forth game that ensued inYemen, on whether to sign the GCC initiative or not, allowed both sides to strengthen their own positions. The periphery was soon lost, or abandoned, and handed over to a number of tribal or militant groups in areas such as al-Jawf in the north, Ma’rib and Hadhramawt in the East and Abyan in the south. The province of Saʻdah, bordering Saudi Arabia, continues to remain under control of Huthi rebels under the leadership of ʻAbd al-Malik al-Huthi. This group, at war with the central government since 2006, represents a major security threat to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and stability along the border continues to depend on a delicate agreement placing renowned arms dealer Faris Manʻa as governor of the province of Saʻdah. Contacts with the rebels has prevented cross-border incursions since 2011, but has not decreased the threat to Saudi Arabia.

Obstacles for Institutional Restructuring

Fears among regional and international actors led to a re-drafting of the GCC Initiative for political transition, signed on 23 November 2011 in Riyadh, wherein priorities where set beyond the handing over of power by ʻAli ʻAbdullah Saleh to his Vice President Hadi. The top priority set to strengthen the political transition became the orderly demilitarization of cities and restructuring of the entire armed forces, not just the army. This is set to be followed by the start of a comprehensive National Dialogue process. The framework established to administer demilitarization and restructuring of the armed was organized within a military commission with equal numbers of officers from units which defected in March 2011 and those still under the control of Ministry of Defense.

The first move to implement one of the “pillars” of the GCC Initiative was the removal of General ʻAbdullah Qayran in Taʻiz and Mahdi al-Maqwalah (of Sanhan), chief of the Southern Command based in ʻAden, in January and March respectively. While General Qayran’s removal was cause for much jubilation inside Freedom Square in Taʻiz, Maqwalah’s departure left a sour taste after Ansar al-Shariʻah escalated their activity in Abyan and caused more people to flee the province to neighboring ʻAden. It has been clear to many that President Hadi and his advisors are carefully calculating their moves, amidst mounting pressure from Western governments, in order to minimize consequences from such an unpredictable balancing of personalities within the armed forces. The incident that followed the sudden announcement Saturday morning April 7^th by President Hadi replacing Air Force Chief Muhammad Saleh al-Ahmar (half brother of ʻAli ʻAbdullah Saleh) is a perfect example of the difficult task. Sanʻa International Airport was closed the entire day as result of fighting within the property, which also serves as the main runway for the Air Force located in the southern area of the civilian airport. Accusations flew back and forth between loyalists to General  Muhammad Saleh, who was then appointed Deputy Minister of Defense, and airport officials. The airport re-opened on Sunday. General Saleh appears to have accepted President Hadi’s order and on 16 April he left his post and traveled to Sanhan. But the issue remains unresolved as of 21 April.

In her most recent opinion piece, Ginny Hill indicated many of the obstacles to restructuring the armed forces were anchored on continued regime competition. That is, in the context of the equation that pins ousted President ʻAli ʻAbdullah Saleh, his long-time confidant General ʻAli Muhsin (Firqahh Commander) and the al-Ahmar family on a confrontation for survival in a transitional period. Much of this competition is indeed obstructing the restructuring, but observers are also missing much of the larger picture. The military has not only been a family dominion, it forms part of the principle instrument of patronage inYemen since 1962 in the north and 1967 in the south. It would be a colossal mistake to assume that Saleh’s relatives and their regime competitors where the only ones standing in the way of a comprehensive restructuring of the armed forces. Elites from the north and south are fully dependent on the military and intelligence services for the own survival. In addition, the most difficult obstacle to overcome will be the deeply rooted tribal interests that overlay the armed forces.

Hashid and Sanhan

In this situation we must first consider the struggle for survival within the Hashid tribal confederation. Shaykh Sadiq ibn ʻAbdullah al-Ahmar, brother of Hamid al-Ahmar, is the paramount shaykh of Hashid, to which the village of Sanhan belongs by means of tribal alliance. Many attribute the rise of ʻAli ʻAbdullah Saleh and his 33 years of rule to a “deal” from 1978 between Shaykh ʻAbdullah al-Ahmar, ʻAli ʻAbdullah Saleh, and ʻAli Muhsin. This deal would protect the longstanding position of Hashid and its tribal members within the political structure of the Republic. It is then no mystery as to why Shaykh Hamid al-Ahmar has been one of the principle supporters of the ‘Youth Revolution’ of 2011. Primarily, the al-Ahmar family began to feel threatened by changes in the relationship with Saleh in the past ten years, when it was decided to prepare Ahmad ʻAli ʻAbdullah Saleh to succeed his father as president of Yemen.

This move to select Ahmad ʻAli as successor was not in itself a threat, but rather the restructuring of political relations that aimed at alienating Bayt al-Ahmar from the decision making process. Hamid began to see new blood at the presidential palace, a new patronage network that threatened his own. Such moves were also reflected in the repositioning of the Republican Guard, in particular, vis-à-vis ʻAli Muhsin’s Firqahh. During the six wars against Huthi rebels in the north the struggle between Ahmad ʻAli and ʻAli Muhsin deepened to direct conflict within al-Urdhi (headquarters for the Armed Forces) and the office of the Chiefs of Staff. The internal conflict also began to affect tribal relations. Interests of various shaykhs were threatened when some tribal areas were protected by the government while others were neglected during the war against Huthi rebels. These tribal leaders not only had interests in areas in ʻAmran and Saʻdah, but also their tribesmen were being killed without any retribution. Many shaykhs were requested to send troops to fight Huthis only to be underpaid or under equipped. While Sanhan believes to be the center of power over the past 33 years, it is Hashid who claims primacy and aims to prevent southerners from taking over a unified Republic, and its resources.

Tribal Patronage

Underneath the surface then lie the mid-level shaykhs of Hashid and Bakil (the second-most powerful tribal confederation). Many of these tribal leaders, allied to the house of Shaykhs al-Shayf and ʻAbu Ras, for example, in addition to Bayt al-Ahmar, believe that restructuring of the armed forces is a direct threat to their own individual survival. Northern shaykhs are inherently linked to an extensive patronage network with origins at the end of the northern civil war of 1962-1970. They are not just part of Saleh’s or ʻAli Muhsin’s patronage, they are part and parcel of the Republic’s patronage legacy. Many leaders may not be in government of Parliament, but they and their tribes have been vital keepers of the Republic, and if their patron is removed then they will lose all privileges, most importantly income and weapons as result of their conscripts within the various branches of the military. A comprehensive restructuring of the armed forces, beyond the removal of Saleh’s, ʻAli Muhsin’s and al-Ahmar’s relatives would also require addressing the presence of many tribal elements loyal to one side or the other. President Hadi must first calculate the consequences from removing personnel from one side quicker then the other, or removing a larger contingency from one side as oppose to the other.

President Hadi must surely be asking himself, which side do I remove first? Which will pose the least challenges? What will the one side do when elements from the other are removed? If a tribal leader with interests in the armed forces begins to feel his patron will lose in the process, they may recall their tribesmen and withdraw to their local area. This will strengthen their position in the periphery and deprive the government of authority within their territory. By withdrawing their men, they will not hold loyalty to any one until it is renegotiated, at a high price indeed. The men will withdraw with their weapons, since no one at this time is powerful enough to prevent them from doing so. How many shaykhs will opt for this choice? We don’t know. If one side is removed before the other, in proportion or otherwise, it may be clear to both patron and client that a fight against the President as proxy or against the other side directly will be in their best interest. President Hadi has everything to lose in this scenario.

At a time of deep economic crisis across the country, ignored by all sides, tribal leaders must protect their own interests in order to prevent further unemployment and deeper discontent among local populations. Patronage is not only a tool for wealth creation in Yemen, it is a way to remain relevant vis-à-vis local tribal populations and retain the prestige of hereditary titles. Reports of widespread famine in Yemenoften focus on urban populations, which suffer tremendously as result of sky-rocketing inflation, but it is in the mountain and dessert villages where hunger is merely satisfied with bread and water, or wheat (‘azid) and yogurt. Shaykhs may not spread the wealth around as evenly as people would want, but at minimum they do provide some relief to people in their villages. It is not in their own interests to allow people to starve, for they will lose the foundation of their own reputation and status. Shaykhs do not only have a dozen or so tribesmen as guards for their own protection in the public sphere, this is a way to provide ‘employment’ to tribesmen and also to strengthen their own patronage networks.

A Careful Balancing Act

As one tribal figure put it, and as much as I tried to avoid the cliché, there are three main concentric circles when dealing with restructuring of the armed forces. The first circle includes Saleh and his family, ʻAli Muhsin and Bayt al-Ahmar, in essence, Hashid and Sanhan. The second circle is referred to as the circle of corruption. This is where the patronage network extends to relatives, business associates and tribal elements. The third circle is what many refer to as the circle of hope, where many of the officers capable of constructing a modern, professional military lay. Tribal elements in the military and mature officers do see a light at the end of the tunnel, but they realize it’s a long tunnel. The GCC initiative was meant to primarily prevent a civil war in theArabian Peninsula. It managed to stave off much of the tension mounting through 2011. But the GCC deal was mainly a deal between the elite, Saleh and ʻAli Muhsin, Saleh and al-Ahmar, and Saleh and al-Islah. It failed to address the people’s demands, and left a window of opportunity for whoever can rescue those hopes for change.

At the moment al-Islah seems to be gaining ground on this front. Although protest squares are now occupied by a solid majority of supporters of al-Islah, Friday prayers continue to attract a large number of independents. This portion of society is no longer interested in the permanent, physical presence at Change Square (Sanʻa) or Freedom Square (Taʻiz), but rather makes itself available to the rally calls to protest each week. This is a great asset for al-Islah, ʻAli Muhsin and bayt al-Ahmar. They have proven their resolve and to a certain degree, their public support. In real terms, it may not mean much since Friday prayer demands are no longer based on issues espoused by large crowds in 2011. Yet, this still keeps President Hadi thinking of what the intent is and what may be the options available to Islah’s side, and to ʻAli ʻAbdullah Saleh on the other hand.

President Hadi has yet to make his mark in the public sphere, but he has moved cautiously to strengthen his position in the face of mounting pressures from all sides. The president still has much to accomplish in the short term, while his options still remain open and potentially leading to change in real terms. The relationship between Prime Minister Muhammad Salem BaSundwah and President Hadi may not be a match made in heaven, but it is not a destructive one either. Outside influences on the Prime Minister are obvious, as he is the spokesperson for the opposition group the Joint Meeting Party (JMP), as part of the transition government. Everyone understands that although the JMP is fragmented at the moment, half of the ministers in government must protect the group in order to protect themselves. It still remains a difficult task to convince cabinet members to accept losses on their side of the camp. Whether the losses are on the civilian side, such as governors, or the military, neither the General People’s Congress (GPC) nor the JMP can accept huge losses at any one time. At the moment, reality points to all losses being one sided, and even though Gen. ʻAli Muhsin promises to resign and retire from government service, the GPC sees no movement against the opposition on the part of President Hadi, who is in fact the leader of the GPC as its Secretary General.

All of this balancing comes in the backdrop of demands by all sides to engage the process for National Dialogue. As prescribed by the GCC Initiative, the Dialogue process is meant to reconcile all sides, in particular the Southern Secessionist movement and the Huthi rebels in the north. Most in the opposition claim dialogue is moot without military restructuring, aimed at removing all influence from former president ʻAli ʻAbdullah Saleh and his relatives. But some, in diplomatic circles and within the party in majority in parliament (GPC) claim there cannot be any restructuring until the dialogue begins. We are back to square one, what comes first, the chicken or the egg? It seems even the United States has realized restructuring of the armed forces will take longer than expected, and this has led officials visiting Sanʻa to announce their support for the start of the Dialogue process even though the military is still relatively intact. If work is to be done inYemen, under relative stability, it will continue at a slow pace. As of April 11 President Hadi initiated new military operations against Ansar al-Shariʻah in the south (some units have refused the order). This will lead to further clashes around the country that have to be contained, at minimum, before the president’s next move regarding the armed forces or the National Dialogue. BaSundwah’s visit to Doha from April 9-11 may lead to further support from regional neighbors, but unfortunately his first announcement focused on support for the National Dialogue, not the economy or further pressure to be exerted on personalities on the list to leave the country. Further patience will be required if deeper fracturing of the armed forces is to be avoided, which could once again threatened a civil war scenario.

The new enigma: who will be the next Vice President?

Fernando Carvajal looks at the possible picks for President Hadi's deputy:

Does Yemen’s President, 'Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, need a strong or weak vice president? This may not be the only question we have to deal with, for we would also ask if the new Deputy should be close to Saleh’s family in order to maintain party cohesion or someone close to those who dissented after the March 18 massacre?

Article 105(B) of the Yemeni Constitution stipulates “The President shall have a Vice President” (http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/gov/con94.htm), making it an obligation to appoint a Deputy, even during the transition period. The final version of the GCC initiative does not at all address this matter, but as understood by insiders, what ever is prescribed by the Initiative stands above the constitution, and what ever is not directly specified in the GCC document falls within the constitutional text. Rumors that President Hadi would neglect Article 105 (B) and decide not to appoint a Deputy for the duration of the two year transition period have been laid to rest as new rumors of potential candidates for the post surfaced.

With this is mind we can then move to address the question at hand. President 'Abd Rabbuh will need a Deputy that strengthens his primary goals, which remain obscure. Analysts can spend hours trying to decipher priorities of the new government, but as we have learned in the past, what we believe to be a priority may not even be on the radar. We can speculate on whether further cooperation with the US government is a priority, hence the strong statement during Hadi’s swearing-in speech on February 25 against al-Qaeda in the presence of the US Ambassador. Or may be it was to send a message to the new Saudi Crown Prince, knowing that the Kingdom will remain Yemen’s primary ally and provider of financial assistance. His priority may be to consolidate power in order to strengthen his position at the start of the National Dialogue process. We can go on and on speculating and still end up flat wrong at the end. But if we look into the potential names of candidates we may gain further insight once the individual is chosen and takes up his post beside President 'Abd Rabbuh.

The rumor over who would be the next Vice President began with two names, Abdul Qader Hilal (former governor of Hadhramawt and son-in-law of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh) and Ali Muhammed Mujawar (originally from Shebwa and former Prime Minister). The latter has most likely been instantly dismissed since it has been agreed that the next deputy must be a northerner, and more specific, of tribal origin and not just from Ibb or Taiz. Mujawar would be the third top official of southern origin and it would be nearly unacceptable to have the executive branch fully composed of southerners. Mr. Hilal is not only a relative of Saleh but he is also from Senhan, which would indicate President Hadi would aim at deterring any potential threats from Senhanis who face the end of over 30 years of political and military domination. His appointment would also strengthen Saleh’s family position in the transition period and prevent their marginalization in the period leading to the next parliamentary elections, presidential election and most importantly restructuring of the armed forces.

Reaction to this initial rumor naturally led to people countering by injecting Dr. Abdul Karem al-Iryani’s (former prime Minister and primary political advisor to Ali Abdullah Saleh) name along with Hilal’s. Yemenis saw this as a natural balance to rumors of Hilal as the front runner. Dr. Iryani has made no public comment on the issue, and it would be difficult to imagine that such an experienced politician would allow others to use his name in a game of ponds, but it would also be difficult to imagine him saying no to President Hadi if personally offered the post. There is also the matter of Dr. Iryani’s persona. There is no other Yemeni politician with the degree of respect and confidence internationally as well as within the region of the Arabian Peninsula. He would represent a high value asset for Hadi with regards to the necessary confidence required to secure international assistance during the transition period, whether financial or technical.

Yet, if we were to be logical in our analysis (if!) then most would agree that Dr. Iryani would be a greater asset for president Hadi within the General People’s Congress (GPC). Iryani has also served as deputy Secretary General of the GPC, under 'Abd Rabbuh, for a long time, and as co-chair of the Dialogue committee, also with 'Abd Rabbuh, no one else knows the process and the actors like him. Dr. Iryani will remain a major asset for the president within the party, and this would allow him to multi-task and multiply his contributions to Hadi’s priorities. As Hadi’s Deputy his role may be limited vis-à-vis the party and the opposition, whether it’s Islah or Houthis or the Southern Movement. Again, how do we identify the president’s priorities?

Some insiders go beyond the suggestion that the next Deputy should be a northerner. Some have even suggested it would be a smart move for Hadi to appoint a Zaydi northerner, not so much a Houthi or a sayyid, but a Zaydi tribesman. Along this line some also suggested Rashad al-Ailami (former Minister of Interior and highly trusted security official) and Yahya al-Ra’i (current speaker of Parliament). Both were injured during the attempted assassination of President Saleh on June 3, 2011. Neither would fit the criteria proposed but they represent ties to Saleh’s family as well as people of confidence within the security establishment.

The last name suggested by few people is Qaleb Mutahar al-Qamish (current head of PSO and former Minister of Interior, also of Hashid origin). Mr. Qaleb represents the most interesting candidate. A northern tribesman of Zaydi origin and highly trusted across the GPC establishment. In addition, he represents the future of the security establishment. Rumor has it the intelligence agencies will merge under a new agency. This new structure may serve to ease the way out of Saleh’s relatives as well as serve as confidence building measures for relations with the West and Saudi Arabia. He would be a strong asset for Hadi but problematic vis-à-vis the revolutionary youth and activists. Islah itself might not have a problem with Mr. Qaleb, but grassroots activists and other opposition parties will look at this nomination as intensifying the image of a police state.

It is still unlikely that President Hadi will appoint a Deputy on Monday during the farewell ceremony for 'Ali 'Abdullah Saleh, but it would be a priority if he wishes to deter further criticism over the lack of constitutional legitimacy for the transition process. We must keep in mind that pressure on Hadi doesn’t only come from protesters in San'a and Ta'iz, who will use Syria’s situation in order to sustain numbers every Friday, but pressure also comes from regional neighbors needed increased stability and Western governments who have invested a lot in the transition process as a potential model for other Arab states confronting the Arab Spring tsunami. If the rumor is correct that the option to pass on a Deputy was considered then we imagine the nomination of a non-threatening personality, who does not represent and asset to Hadi either but merely serves a ceremonial post for the duration of the transition period. This person may not even contribute to the constitutional reform process and therefore not have any ambitions to be in office after the coming parliament elections.

It's (still) the economy, stupid.

We're pleased to present another guest post by PhD candidate Fernando Carvajal, who spent most of 2011 embedded in Yemen's revolution, and is now deeply involved in the task of helping the country rebuild. In today's post he argues that the new government and administration--as well as the international community--must prioritize Yemen's economic situation.

Now that people refer to this as the post-Saleh era, and the Gulf Cooperation Council removed a thorn from its side, it is time to step up or shut up. Regional and international actors worked tirelessly to ensure a quick and ‘peaceful’ end to Yemen’s popular uprising of 2011, but none have spoken of concrete efforts to aid the Republic and its new President to recover from a dire economic crisis. The promise of a meeting of the Friends of Yemen lingers on since President Saleh signed the GCC initiative on November 23, 2011. The goals of political stability and a peaceful transfer of authority have been achieved, but what of addressing the root causes of the uprising in order to avoid a renewed conflict?

Some observers and government officials in Sana’a may say that security is the number one priority for the post election period, but this is merely playing with the age old debate over what comes first, security or the economy. The people were suffering from a near famine and worsening economy at the national level prior to the start of the popular uprising of February 2011. Then, the economy was not a priority. Officials always blamed international partners for not delivering on promises made after the 2006 presidential election, while the international community and neighbors blamed widespread corruption as the reason for delay in delivering over $5 billion in aid. This became the same excuse when the dysfunctional Friends of Yemen group was established and again no aid was delivered outside the $150 million authorized following the terrorist attempt by the Underware Bomber Christmas day 2009.

The uprising in Yemen was perceived as a higher threat to stability in the Peninsula than Egypt of Tunisia. It was believed events in Yemen would serve to encourage dissent in Bahrain and other Gulf states. The powers that be moved immediately in early 2011 to ensure no Yemeni center of power would escalate the conflict and create a spill-over throughout the Peninsula. The youth movement was overwhelmed by the organized opposition and military defectors aiming to regain the monopoly on mobilization. This has ultimately failed, for protest squares still maintain the physical presence of resolute young men and women who may not yet be satisfied with the transfer of authority from President Saleh to his Vice President, Abdo Rabo Mansur Hadi, through the one man election of February 21, 2012. But aside from a lack of organization and cohesive leadership the youth do remain hopeful in realizing the remaining goals of their ‘revolution’. And while the precedent of yet another successful electoral process in Yemen does represent a challenge for neighboring rulers, there is still no popular awareness in the Peninsula demanding increased access to the ballot box. The Peninsula is now on Guarded (blue) level rather than Severe (Orange).

Yemen’s economy is so deeply neglected internationally and regionally that it is completely off the media radar. Also, Yemen has been ignored even by the upcoming Jeddah Economic Forum of 3-6 March, 2012. The people of Yemen continue to be ignored while they lack access to stable fuel supplies, electricity, suffer from increasing inflation and diminishing imports. The Yemeni Rial has made gains against the dollar in recent weeks, but banks continue to suffer from low deposits and with minimal international trade, this will not improve any time soon.

Arab governments can no longer neglect dire economic crises. This is no longer time for international priorities, it is time for action to serve the people, or gains will be lost to renewed conflict. In addition, this vacuum will provide fertile ground for the expansion of groups aiming to further destabilize the country. It is a fact that neither the Houthi group nor the Southern Movement currently offer any relief to their ‘people’, never mind a viable option nationally, but they will continue to agitate their followers. During his visit to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi at the start of 2012 PM BaSundwa mentioned Yemen would need about $10 billion, but no one stepped up. In mid-February President Obama’s administration announced a total of $800 million in support of the Arab Spring, Yemen’s share of ‘millions’ don’t begin to scratch the surface. If we look at the government’s budget and the impact of the uprising it is estimated Yemen needs an instant influx of cash of around $3 billion. This will allow the government to inject cash into all ministries in order to meet payroll, deferred for almost three months for some people. The amount will also support payments to the military and allow the government to deal with restoration of public areas around the country.

In addition to this immediate cash the government will need about $5 billion for fiscal year 2012. This amount will provide liquidity to address a number of priorities that will lead to popular trust on the government and the transition process. Without a comprehensive strategy to address the economic crisis no one will be able to call for a stable dialogue process, nor be able to challenge continued agitation by Houthis or the Southern Movement. Unfortunately, people have to accept that an “anti-corruption” campaign by President Hadi will be suicide. It cannot be a priority this year. Corruption is not only at the top, but deeply rooted among ordinary employees whose salaries do not meet the standard of living. One still has to pay the electrician to connect the power line even after the official bill has been paid, never mind government agencies with extensive bureaucratic procedures. International donors should demand increased transparency and accountability, but not a head on anti-corruption campaign. If Yemenis and international partners really want a ‘new Yemen’ each must put forth their best effort to fight corruption from the bottom-up and implement stronger accountability measures immediately. The standard of living will not improve unless the government makes it the number one priority.

Will the GCC deal destroy itself, or can a real transition be salvaged?

I was asked last week to write an op-ed about Yemen's upcoming presidential "election" for a German magazine. Because most of our readers don't read German (myself included), I'm publishing the English version of my article here, and the German version is available at Zenith Magazine Online. I expect many readers to disagree with parts of this piece, or think that I'm oversimplifying things. I think there's a lot about these issues that needs to be discussed, so please comment if you feel so inclined. In particular, I expect some readers to take issue with the last section, where I lay out a very simplistic prescription for a very complicated problem. I'm aware that these things are easier said than done, but the problem at hand is an existential one and must be confronted, regardless of how hard this solution might be to implement.

On February 21, Yemen will hold a presidential election that will defy almost every notion of what an election should be. Contrary to Yemeni law, the “election” will feature only one candidate, whose victory has been decided ahead of time; but even if the election’s result is certain, its effects are difficult to predict.

The voting process in question—“referendum” is a more accurate description than “election,” but both words are far too suggestive of democracy for this occasion—has been mandated not by the Yemeni constitution, nor by popular demand, but by an agreement signed by the heads of Yemen’s largest political parties and written by representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), hardly experts in the science of representative government. The GCC initiative, which was heavily sponsored by the United States and brokered in part by the United Nations, was foisted upon Yemen as an ostensible solution to what the GCC liked to call Yemen’s “political crisis,” the year-long popular revolution against the regime of President ʻAli ʻAbdullah Saleh. In actual fact, the deal could fail to meet any the revolution’s demands, while giving Saleh everything he could ask for.

Vice President ‘Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi—who has served Saleh since 1994 and has no real power base of his own—has been “nominated” by both Saleh’s ruling party, the General People’s Congress (GPC) and the opposition coalition, the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), and will run unopposed (a few independent revolutionaries have declared their intentions to run, but none has been certified by parliament). With no opponent, Hadi is guaranteed victory. But other than a promotion for Hadi, it’s not clear what, if anything, the election will achieve.

The GCC initiative was drafted in late May after a series of negotiations that began in March, when a number of prominent political and military figures broke away from the regime in response to the March 18 massacre of over 50 protesters in Sanʻa. By the time Saleh signed the deal in late November, his forces had killed hundreds more and pushed the country to the verge of all-out civil war. Since the signing, incidents of large-scale violence have decreased, but otherwise not much has changed.

The unity government formed in December (another creation of the GCC deal) has thus far failed to achieve its most pressing objective, the demilitarization of Yemen’s cities and the restructuring of Yemen’s divided military. Saleh’s close relatives still command much of the armed forces and other coercive apparatuses. In fact, a great deal of Saleh’s regime remains intact. ‘Ali Saleh himself is currently vacationing in New York, and has said more than once that he plans to return to Yemen before February 21 to “participate” in Hadi’s big day. His exact plans for the near future are unclear, but neither the GCC deal nor the facts on the ground would prevent him from meddling in the political arena once the letter of the agreement has been carried out, especially since Yemen’s parliament has already passed a law granting Saleh and his henchmen full immunity from legal action (another stipulation of the deal).

Plenty of intelligent and well-meaning observers have argued in favor of both the immunity provision and the one-candidate election. Full immunity, they argue, was necessary to induce Saleh to sign the agreement and step down. In reality, however, the immunity provision has been counterproductive. It has alienated several revolutionary factions from the political process, prompting the so-called Huthi movement and much of the Southern Movement to announce boycotts of the coming election. It has deprived the new government of an avenue by which it could have removed regime officials from power and recovered purloined state revenues. Most important, though, is the lesson the provision teaches Saleh (not to mention Bashar al-Assad, Hamad al-Khalifah, et al.): that in the eyes of the world, ten months of brutality is no worse than four; that the reward for intransigence is leniency. The GCC deal handed Saleh a victory over his opponents he could never have won by force of arms; with that victory under his belt, and his loyal sons, nephews, and brothers still firmly ensconced in positions of power, what does it matter who bears the title of president?

The GCC initiative contains several provisions that are well thought-out and have the potential to be extremely beneficial. In fact, much of the initiative mirrors the original demands of Yemen’s revolutionary youth: the formation of a Conference of National Dialogue that includes all factions and parties, the drafting of a new constitution and a popular referendum to approve it, a sweeping process of political, judicial, educational, and economic reform to address the basic grievances of the people. But in order for any of those plans to come to fruition, two things must happen first. Before any other progress can be made, the entire Saleh family must be removed from power. With half of the military and huge tranches of the economy in their hands, any other reforms will be superficial. Second, the leaders of the transition and their foreign backers must convince all of the major revolutionary factions to buy in to the transitional process. By granting Saleh and his associates immunity from legal action and failing to place any other restraints on their behavior, the GCC agreement renders impossible the first of these. By forcing a farcical election on the country, it seriously hinders the second.

The international community’s mistakes can still be remedied, however, if the Yemeni transitional authorities are willing to take immediate, decisive action. President-elect Hadi should draft, with the approval of the unity government, a mechanism that would forbid ‘Ali Saleh from having any involvement in politics, and ban all of his immediate family members from military and political positions as well. This won’t be easy to accomplish, but one way or another it must be done if there is to be a meaningful transition. If the governments of the GCC and their friends in the west are at all serious about helping Yemen move forward, they must encourage Hadi in taking this step, and support the decision in any way possible. Once the complete removal of Saleh and his kinsmen is achieved, Hadi and the unity government must immediately assemble the Conference of National Dialogue and constitutional commission. The longer it takes the government to implement this phase of the GCC initiative, the more alienated the revolutionary factions will become, and the less likely groups like the Huthis and the Southern Movement will be to participate in Yemen’s transitional institutions.

If Hadi can summon the will to take decisive action now, Yemen may yet make the most of the deeply flawed transition plan. If not, come February 22, Hadi may find himself a president without a country.