Almigdad Mojalli, 1980-2016

Almigdad Mojalli was a dedicated and talented Yemeni journalist who wrote for international outlets including Voice of America and IRIN. He was killed by a Saudi airstrike on January 17 while reporting on the civilian toll of a previous strike outside of San‘a. He leaves behind a wife and a young son. Two of Almigdad's colleagues, Shuaib Almosawa and Kareem Fahim, wrote about Almigdad for The New York Times this week.

Mr. Mojalli...wrote about the dilemmas Yemeni journalists faced, working and living in a war zone and juggling the job with worries for family and friends. In September,writing for IRIN, an international news service that focuses on humanitarian issues, he chronicled yet another strike. This time, the victims included relatives.

Before that attack, he had become desensitized, he said. "I’ve been to dozens of bomb sites," he wrote. "Every day, I wake up to hear that 10 people were killed last night, or 20, or 40. It almost stops feeling real."

An online donation page has been created to raise money for Almigdad's widow and child.

Arbitrary detention by the Houthis - HRW

A new report by Human Rights Watch details the Houthi forces' practice of arbitrarily detaining and disappearing individuals with ties--real or imagined--to the Islah Party or other opposition groups. The report provides details of more than 20 cases of arbitrary detention and forced disappearance, out of 35 cases confirmed by HRW investigators. The people illegally detained by the Houthis include political activists, Islah party members, journalists, and lawyers. According to one Yemeni attorney interviewed by HRW, more than 800 people are currently being held by Houthi authorities in and around San‘a:

He said that based on information he has gathered from sources knowledgeable about detentions, the Houthis were holding at least 250 at al-Thawra pretrial detention facility, 180 at Habra pretrial detention facility, 167 at the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), 165 opposition figures at Sanaa Central Prison, 73 at the Political Security Organization’s headquarters, 20 at al-Judairi police station, 10 at one of the homes of the former First Armored Division commander, Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and an unknown number at Zain al-Abdeen mosque in Hiziyaz.

Based on interviews with witnesses and family members, the report claims that Houthi authorities are depriving many detainees of food and water, preventing them from contacting anyone on the outside, and holding them in otherwise illegal and abusive conditions. One journalism student, for example, who has been imprisoned for more than four months, was "first held for three days without food or being allowed to use the bathroom." A professor at San‘a University's medical school "was being held in a three-by-three meter cell with 14 other men and was only allowed to use the bathroom once a day."

Read the full report here.

Independent intellectuals under threat - Bonnefoy

In a recent piece published by OpenDemocracy.net, French scholar Laurent Bonnefoy examines the post-revolution trend of attacks on independent activists and thinkers, and the related polarization of Yemen's political and intellectual arena. Bonnefoy focuses in particular on a recent attack on Nabil Subay, a famous journalist/poet/social critic:

On 2 January 2016 in Sana’a, Nabil Subay, a Yemeni journalist, heads for lunch with friends. Unidentified gunmen attack him on a busy street: they beat him violently about the head and shoot him in both legs. He is taken to hospital and operated on. One of his colleagues, Muhammad Aysh, immediately places responsibility on the Houthis, given that the city is under their control; they allowed this aggression to happen and let the perpetrators escape....

...The attack he suffered in early January 2016 symbolises a deep and worrying dynamic emerging in a country which, only a few years ago, and particularly during the 2011 revolutionary moment, demonstrated a flourishing of ideas and creativity. As the political situation has become increasingly tense since 2014, far too many independent and moderate personalities have been murdered or suffered violence and intimidation.

As Bonnefoy points out, groups on many sides of Yemen's political divides have carried out assassinations, arrests, and other acts of intimidation and repression against their ideological enemies in recent years. The atmosphere such acts create will only make it harder for Yemen to ever emerge from the present conflict.

Coalition drops cluster bombs on San‘a - HRW

Human Rights Watch has investigated reports of the use of cluster munitions in Saudi-led airstrikes on Yemen's capital, San‘a. As of Thursday, HRW had found indisputable evidence of the weapons in two neighborhoods, according to a report published today. The cluster munitions used were manufactured in the USA, and were likely sold to Saudi Arabia or another participating air force by the US, though Saudi Arabia has been known to buy US munitions from third countries as well. Although neither the US nor KSA has signed the international ban on cluster munitions, the use of such weapons--which are, by their nature, indiscriminate--in populated areas is a crime under international humanitarian law. From the HRW report:

“The coalition’s repeated use of cluster bombs in the middle of a crowded city suggests an intent to harm civilians, which is a war crime,” said Steve Goose, arms director at Human Rights Watch. “These outrageous attacks show that the coalition seems less concerned than ever about sparing civilians from war’s horrors.”

Residents of two Sanaa neighborhoods described aerial attacks consistent with cluster bomb use. A resident of al-Zira`a Street told Human Rights Watch that his family was awakened at 5:30 a.m. on January 6 by dozens of small explosions. He said that he had been at work, but that his wife told him that when the family fled they saw many homes and a local kindergarten with newly pockmarked walls and broken windows.

A resident of Hayal Sayeed, another residential neighborhood, described hearing small explosions at around 6 a.m. He went out on the street, he said, and saw more than 20 vehicles covered in pockmarks, including his own, as well as dozens of pockmarks in the road. He said that at least three houses in the area had pockmarked walls and broken windows. He found a fragment in his car, he said.

Read the report here.

Happy New Year, from San‘a

[This post was sent to us by a special guest contributor, Fatima Noman. Fatima is 16 years old, and lives in San‘a. This is her third post for the Mafraj Blog.] The thing is when I close my eyes tighter، I hear them louder. Shutting down one sense only clarifies another. The speed of light is a thousand times faster than the speed of sound, the only thing faster than that is the rate at which my heart beats. 9 months later and nothing has changed; my mouth dangles and my eyes widen, enlarge and I taste the end, not of this coalition; but of my life. My life that seems to have been ephemeral and now is burdened be.

Looking back on how much I've grown, the only visible difference is how any sound whether cars passing by, motorcycles approaching my neighborhood or one of my siblings slamming the door too fast or strutting harshly in the second floor -or third or fourth-, scares me and makes me tremble to my feet. I've grown accustomed to my realm of vulnerability.

They say there have been over ten thousand air raids on Yemen, I've seen every memory of the past 16 years flash before my eyes at least ten thousand times. With every air raid I remember my mother's warm embrace at 6 and my father's loving arms at 8. My sister's advice at 13 and my brother's fights on daily basis. The last time I laughed till my stomach hurt and cried tears of joy. I then remember God and sometimes think; how bad can it be under his arms, it can't possibly be scarier than here?

With every unannounced burst of light I regret every fight with my dad and argument with my mom. I remorse every time I discarded my sister and boycotted my brother for his "nuisance". As much as that illuminance of light terrifies me, it reminds me how blessed I was and am and will be. Yes, will be; I won't die. I refuse to die, not in their hands. I will live to be 80 and I will make memories enough to heal all the scars made since the 26th of March. I will heal and I will blossom.

Everything seems minuscule and diminutive when compared to death. Your existence, your hopes, your aspirations. You can never really submit to death and accept it, we know it accompanies us wherever we go. Yet we never act like it's tangible we deem it as an "imaginary friend". A friend we only address when we meet face to face. Once we leave its residence, we go back to disregarding it. Whether its a blessing or a curse to become so resilient to death, I'll never know. But for the time being I will dispose the thought of death because I know a burst of light propelled towards me from a jet miles away will not be the death of me. I refuse it to be.

And as 2015 comes to an end I have never been happier to end a chapter in my life. 2015 has been by far the hardest year of my life. Looking back at it, I hit so many milestones and I've reached my highest and lowest points all in the course of 365 days. It's crazy how much one year can do. I met some of the greatest, most inspirational people this year, and for that I am eternally grateful. I was privileged to witness a coalition attack my country first hand whilst having no valid reason to attack. I can't wait to have children one day and tell them all about this year, the longest most fruitful and vain year ever. I can't wait to speak about 2015 in past tense.

Happy New Year

T-shirt design contest

To celebrate our upcoming second International Yemeni Film & Arts Festival, the YPP is holding a t-shirt design contest! We're looking for creative designs that relate in some way to Yemen and the YPP's mission. T-shirts featuring the winning design will be sold at the 2016 Festival and on the YPP website. The winning designer will receive a cash prize of $100 and recognition on the website.

[big_text]Submissions will be accepted through February 7, 2016.[/big_text]

Details:

• Designs must be your own original work.
• Designs may include line art, text, and photographs.
• Designs may include the words "The Yemen Peace Project" or "International Yemeni Film & Arts Festival," or may be without text.
• Designs may use a maximum of three colors (not including background).
• You may submit no more than three designs per person.
• We reserve the right to make changes to submissions, such as image size and colors.
• By submitting a design, you grant us permission to use your design on the YPP website and promotional materials.

Submit your designs here!

How Sectarianism is Poisoning Yemen - Farea al-Muslimi

In a recent article for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Yemeni analyst and commentator Farea al-Muslimi explores the role of sectarianism in Yemen's current conflict. Al-Muslimi also gives a brief overview of the role religious identity has (and hasn't) played in Yemeni political conflicts since the mid-20th century. It has become common for foreign observers to classify Yemen's war as another manifestation of the apparent conflict along sectarian lines that is being played out in other parts of the region. But Yemen specialists generally take issue with this characterization, and say that sectarian rhetoric is new to Yemen's political scene. There's truth to that position, but it's not the whole story. In this article, al-Muslimi does an excellent job of tracing the peaks and troughs of sectarian framing across several decades.

While Yemen is home to two major religious groups, the Zaydi Shia Muslims in the north and the Sunni Muslims of the Shafi’i school in the south and east, the religious divide has historically been of limited importance. Internal conflicts have certainly been endemic to Yemen, but they have typically been driven by political, economic, tribal, or regional disparities. While these conflicts sometimes coincided with religious differences, they were rarely a primary driver. Instead, religious coexistence and intermingling was taken for granted by most Yemenis and seen as a normal feature of everyday life.

But with the outbreak of the most recent round of conflict after the 2011 Arab Spring, sectarian discourse has become more heated, reorganizing Yemeni society along sectarian lines and rearranging people’s relationships to one another on a non-nationalist basis. It seems that the trend of sectarian polarization that plagues the region, from Iraq to Syria and Lebanon, has finally arrived in Yemen.

Read the article here.

Peace talks end on an optimistic note

A piece in Monday'sNew York Times put a mildly positive spin on the conclusion of the first round of direct peace talks between the Hadi-Bahah government and the Houthi-GPC alliance, which took place in Switzerland last week. The talks did not produce any concrete outcome in terms of ending the conflict in Yemen. However, they did result in increased humanitarian access to the city of Ta'iz, which had been under a total siege by Houthi-Saleh forces, and there was a limited exchange of prisoners between the two sides. Furthermore, according to an anonymous diplomat quoted in the Times, there was a "palpable warming on a personal level between the two delegations over the course of the week." Independent journalist Nawal al-Maghafi has tweeted similar observations from the peace talks:

This round of #peacetalks has officially ended - the fact that they did not collapse & planned another round calls for optimism #Yemen #Biel

— Nawal Al-maghafi (@Nawalf) December 20, 2015

A previous round of talks, held in Geneva in June, collapsed without the two sides even stepping foot in the same room, so the progress achieved in this round, limited though it was, is a good start.

Mapping the Yemen Conflict - ECFR

The European Council on Foreign Relations has put together a series of annotated maps to illustrate the multiple political and social aspects of Yemen's ongoing conflict. This is one of the most useful resources we've seen; it's not clear, however, whether the maps are still being updated.

Check out this feature from the ECFR here.

Blind Air Strikes - Mwatana

The San'a-based NGO Mwatana Organization for Human Rights has released a new report on the Saudi-led coalition's targeting of residential areas and civilian infrastructure in several parts of Yemen. The report "focuses in particular on 44 incidents of aerial attacks conducted by the Saudi Arabia-led Arab coalition which targeted civilians in nine Yemeni provinces including Sana’a, Ta'iz, Lahj, Ibb, Hodaidah, S’adah, Hajja, AL- Baidha and Dhamar over the period from March to October 2015." Read the full report here.

Schools Under Attack in Yemen - Amnesty International

A new report by Amnesty International investigates five airstrikes, carried out by the Saudi-led coalition, on schools in Yemen. The country's education system is in shambles at present. Armed factions on all sides of the conflict have attacked and/or occupied schools. In many parts of the country, displaced people have taken up residence in school buildings, making it difficult or impossible for classes to continue.

Saudi Arabia-led coalition forces have carried out a series of air strikes targeting schools that were still in use, in violation of international humanitarian law, and hampering access to education for thousands of Yemen’s children, said Amnesty International in a new briefing published today. The coalition forces are armed by states including the USA and UK.

The briefing ‘Our kids are bombed’: Schools under attack in Yemen, investigates five air strikes on schools which took place between August and October 2015 killing five civilians and injuring at least 14, including four children, based on field research in Yemen. While students were not present inside the schools during the attacks, the strikes caused serious damage or destruction which will have long-term consequences for students.

Read Amnesty's full report here.

December 1–7: Assassinations, intra-government squabbles, new peace talks

The past week in Yemen has seen an attempted Cabinet reshuffle, the seizure by al-Qaeda of two towns in Abyan Governorate and the 4^th Military Region headquarters in Aden, and the assassination of Aden’s governor, an act which was quickly claimed by a local Islamic State affiliate. Meanwhile, airstrikes and ground combat have continued in central Yemen and beyond the borders with Saudi Arabia. On Monday, December 7, the UN special envoy for Yemen announced that a new round of peace talks will be held next week, beginning on December 15. A ceasefire is expected to be announced on the eve of the talks, although such announcements in the recent past have come to nothing. On December 1, President Abdu Rabbuh Mansur Hadi issued decrees appointing five ministers to the cabinet of PM/VP Khaled Bahah. The reshuffle exacerbated the lingering Hadi-Bahah dispute; PM/VP Bahah reportedly refused to recognize the new appointments, as the president has no legal authority to replace cabinet ministers. On December 2, AQAP militants captured the towns of Zinjibar and Jaʻar in Abyan, following a predawn swift attack that killed the brother of the commander of the local Popular Committees, which were formed to fight the militants.

Also on Tuesday, unidentified gunmen abducted a Tunisian staffer working for the  ICRC’s office in Sanʻa while on the way to work in the early morning. Her whereabouts remain unknown to date. Some 30 aid workers reportedly left Yemen within 48 afterwards, including 10 ICRC staffers.

While airstrikes continued over the last week to pound positions on several fronts across Yemen, Saudi-led warplanes have targeted residential areas in the northern provinces of Saʻdah and Hajjah, as well as the coastal western province of al-Hudaydah, where another fish market has been hit by airstrikes.

The battles in the central provinces of Marib and Taʻiz continue to intensify.

In Taʻiz the western and eastern fronts have seen clashes escalating amid heavy airstrikes. Near the Red Sea port town of Mokha, pro-Houthi forces have claimed to hit a sixth warship from the coalition navy. In Marib, this week’s fighting has mostly taken place in the western district of Kuwfal.

On Sunday, Aden’s governor, Gen. Jaʻfar Muhammad Saʻad, was killed along with several members of his entourage, as a vehicle packed with explosives collided with his car in the al-Tawahi district of Aden. Local self-proclaimed IS affiliates took responsibility for the attack. Saʻad was tapped by President Hadi in October to take over the governorate. He had lived in exile prior to that, having fought against the Saleh regime in Yemen’s 1994 civil war.

Power Vacuum in Aden - Adam Baron, ECFR

In a new article for the European Council on Foreign Relations, Adam Baron examines the unstable situation in Yemen's southern port city of Aden. The city serves as the provisional capital for President Hadi's government-in-exile, but despite its "liberation" from Houthi-Saleh forces by southern resistance fighters and Gulf state troops, security in Aden is practically nonexistent. On December 6, Aden's recently-appointed governor (nominally loyal to the Hadi government) and several of his guards were assassinated in a car bomb attack in al-Tawahi District. The attack was claimed by a local branch of the Islamic State organization.

The violence and instability in Aden—and for that matter, the rest of the country—remains fueled by patterns of instability that are, at their essence, rooted in years, if not decades, of failure by Yemen’s political leaders. Exacerbated by the ongoing conflict, this power vacuum has only grown in Aden as efforts by the Hadi government and its international allies to bolster the port city’s security have yet to move beyond the nominal stage.

Read the full article here.

Is the international community about to ditch President Hadi?

Observers who keep a close eye on Yemeni affairs have understood for a while that President 'Abdu Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, the man touted by most of the international community as the "legitimate" head of the Yemeni state, does not enjoy the full confidence of his government-in-exile. His vice president/prime minister Khaled Bahah seems to command more respect and admiration, inside and outside Yemen, and the government--based between Aden, Riyadh, and Amman--has long been divided between the president and PM, according to knowledgeable sources. But while this intra-regime conflict has simmered behind closed doors, international officials and diplomats have, for the most part, maintained the fiction of the "legitimate" president's control over the "recognized" government of Yemen.* That facade took a few serious hits this week, as both the AFP and Reuters published articles acknowledging the Hadi-Bahah divide. The AFP's Tuesday piece deals with President Hadi's sudden replacement of several ministers and ambassadors. The crux of the maneuver, according to AFP, was Hadi's attempt to replace Foreign Minister Riyadh Yasin, whom Hadi plucked from obscurity to act (quite incompetently) as his chief diplomat back in late March, and whom Bahah has reportedly despised and refused to work with from day one. If Hadi hoped to repair the breach with his VP/PM by ditching Yasin, he seems to have failed: Reuters reported on Wednesday that Bahah had publicly "rejected" the reshuffle, because the president has no constitutional authority to appoint or dismiss cabinet members.

Also on Tuesday, Reuters put out a piece that was chock-full of quotes from anonymous Yemeni and foreign diplomats dumping on Hadi, and making it clear that no one in the international community is interested in propping up his presidency any longer than is absolutely necessary.

"Hadi has never been popular and it’s not in his interest that the war stop before complete victory. Diplomats know that Hadi is not a serious candidate, and a settlement means he’s out."

A second diplomat said there was now broad agreement that talks were the way forward because the war had reached a stalemate on the ground. But "a few dissenters" including in Hadi's camp were nonetheless holding out for a military victory.....

Western and regional officials have voiced support for Hadi's prime minister and vice president, Khaled Bahah, widely seen as a rival, who some describe as a more capable technocrat.

"The leadership between Bahah and Hadi is not in sync," the second diplomat said, offering praise for Bahah as a "healer" while describing Hadi as more self-interested.

Now, all of that has been conventional wisdom among full-time Yemen watchers for a while now. But when foreign diplomats start saying things like this to the press--especially going so far as to accuse an internationally-backed president of deliberately sabotaging peace talks--it's usually because they've been encouraged to leak by their superiors. While I doubt we'll see figures like John Kerry or UN special Envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed publicly disavowing Hadi, it would seem that the powers that legitimized his presidency are now getting ready to facilitate his exit. Stay tuned.

*Why all the quotation marks? Here's a quick summary of the precariousness of the Hadi-Bahah regime: Hadi was anointed as president of Yemen under the so-called GCC Initiative, an agreement signed by the ruling General Peoples' Congress coalition and the Joint Meeting Parties opposition bloc that eased long-time dictator 'Ali 'Abdullah Saleh out of power. That agreement stipulated that Hadi would govern for a two-year transitional period, with the help of a power-sharing government split between the GPC and JMP. But Hadi stayed in office far past the two-year mark, with no legal basis. He also reshuffled the cabinet, something neither the constitution nor the GCC Initiative gave him authority to do. In late 2014, after the Houthis began their slow-motion coup with the help of former president Saleh, a new government of ostensibly non-partisan technocrats was formed, with Bahah as PM. But most of that government's ministers resigned in January-February 2015, and President Hadi, after fleeing from Yemen to Saudi Arabia, unilaterally appointed new officials to make up for those who didn't join him in exile. So, when foreign officials or media outlets describe Hadi and/or his government as "legitimate," just know that the term is being applied arbitrarily, and with no legal basis.

November 25–30: Marib and Taʻiz still contested; UN demands peace talks

Yemen’s armed conflict has entered its ninth month with no end in sight: airstrikes and ground fighting across Yemen have thus far claimed the lives of more than 5700 people and pushed the country to the brink of famine, according to activist groups and aid agencies. A new report by Human Rights Watch details the failure of the Saudi-led coalition and its western backers to investigate unlawful airstrikes in Yemen, although “the evidence is everywhere.”  The UN special envoy for Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, is still pushing for new peace talks in Geneva. On November 25, Prime Minister/Vice President Khaled Bahah met with Ahmed in the Saudi capital, Riyadh. During the meeting, Bahah said that the delegates of his government aim to come back from the new Geneva talks with a solution that guarantees the restoration of peace and security in Yemen.

On Monday, President Abdu Rabbuh Mansor Hadi received a draft including notes on the agendas that have been proposed by the UN envoy for the proposed session of talks. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon met with PM Bahah on the sidelines of this week’s climate talks in Paris; during the meeting, Ban called on Yemen’s warring parties to return to negotiations immediately and without preconditions. Thus far the Hadi-Bahah government has insisted that the Houthis and their allies must implement UN Security Council resolution 2216 before talks can begin.

Over the weekend, airstrikes in the capital, Sanʻa, targeted once again mountainous positions that have repeatedly been struck over the past months. The warplanes also knocked out the road connecting Dhamar, Ibb, and Taʻiz provinces with Sanʻa.

It’s been two weeks now since coalition and resistance forces launched a major operation to “liberate” Taʻiz Governorate. Justifications for the delay in liberating Taʻiz and Marib have started to appear in the media; while the field commander in charge says the operation is going according to plan, the local tribal resistance commander stated that 10 brigades of Houthi/Saleh forces are fighting to hold their positions in Taʻiz.

Coalition units intensified their efforts to take control of the western part of Taʻiz, near the Red Sea town of Mocha. The western and eastern fronts are reportedly seeing the fiercest clashes since the operation was launched. Pro-Houthi forces are holding their positions in al-Shurayjah and al-Rahidah on the road to the southern province of Lahj despite heavy airstrikes.

Likewise, Marib’s western district of Sirwah has not yet been liberated, despite months of fighting. On Sunday, Marib’s deputy governor said that landmines planted by Houthi/Saleh forces are the main reason behind that.

November 18-24: Taʻiz offensive slows, no new peace talks scheduled

Although it has been over a week since the new round of the UN-sponsored peace talks was supposed to be held, the representatives of the warring parties have not yet convened. Meanwhile, airstrikes and fighting continues in seven areas of Yemen—Taʻiz, Marib, Lahj, Shabwah, al-Dhaliʻ, Ibb, and al-Baydha—and outside three Saudi cities near the border. The UN special envoy for Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, continues to push for this new session, which is now reportedly expected to take place in Geneva in mid-December. Over the weekend, delegates from the Houthi Movement and the General People's Congress party (GPC) flew once again to the Omani capital, Muscat, after they announced their acceptance of the UN envoy's invitation. On Tuesday, Prime Minister/Vice President Khaled Bahah met with the US ambassador to Yemen, Matthew Tueller, in the Saudi capital, Riyadh. During the meeting he assured Tueller that his government is ready for the peace talks on the condition that the Houthis and their allies are “serious and honest” in implementing UN resolution 2216, which calls for their withdrawal from Sanʻa and other areas pro-Houthi forces have captured.

It's been nearly 10 days since the ground offensive was launched to “liberate” the central governorate of Taʻiz: the clashes have been chiefly taking place in the western districts of al-Wazi'iyah, Dhubab and Mowzaʻ, and a few eastern fronts. The pro-Houthi/Saleh forces have retreated from a number of positions there amid heavy airstrikes, but coalition forces and resistance fighters haven’t been able to advance toward Taʻiz city due to landmines planted by Houthi/Saleh forces. Inside the city, rocket bombardments by pro-Houthi/Saleh forces have targeted residential areas as clashes take place in downtown and on the outskirts of Taʻiz.

In Marib governorate, the clashes continue to take place in the western district of Sirwah. PM Bahah briefly visited Marib for less than an hour. His visit on Sunday along with a number of ministers was intended as a morale boost for the local resistance fighters. The Houthi/Saleh forces have reportedly gained a mountainous strategic position in Kawfal area and are still holding a number of positions in Sirwah district.

Sporadic clashes have also continued to take place in the governorates of Shabwah, al-Dhaliʻ, Ibb, and al-Baydha.

In the southeastern province of Hadhramawt, the toll of the first IS-claimed suicide attack on Friday has risen to 18 soldiers and 17 jihadi militants.

November 10–17: Coalition launches Ta‘iz offensive, peace talks postponed

While the new session of UN-sponsored peace talks in Geneva seems to have been postponed, the airstrikes and ground fighting continued over the past week, mostly in central and southern Yemen and beyond the border with Saudi Arabia. Early Tuesday, President Abdu Rabbuh Mansur Hadi returned to his provisional capital, Aden, one day after Yemeni resistance and Saudi-led coalition forces launched a major operation to "liberate" the central city of Taʻiz. Hadi chaired a meeting focused on the security issues in Aden, where a number of areas are reportedly under the control of jihadi militants. On Sunday, Vice President and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah announced from Suqutra Island the return of his cabinet members to the southern port city of Aden.

Amid airstrikes by Saudi Arabia and its allies,  clashes have been taking place in the central governorates of Taʻiz and Marib as well as the southern governorates of Lahj and Shabwah.

In Taʻiz Governorate, fighting has been chiefly raging on the western fronts, near the Red Sea port town of Mokha, in addition to clashes in downtown Taʻiz city, where jihadi militants are believed to be fighting alongside other local resistance factions. Near Mokha town, battles have intensified as the resistance fighters along with Saudi-led coalition forces have gained ground in the al-Waziʻiyah area. However, tens of anti-Houthi forces were reportedly killed in roadside ambush.

In Marib, tribal fighters and coalition forces have attempted once again to advance in the western Sirwah district, with air support from fighter jets and Apache helicopters. Meanwhile, Yemeni Army (pro-Hadi) Chief of Staff, Major General Mohammad ʻAli al-Maqdashi, visited the district to oversee the battles there.

In Lahj, clashes have taken place near al-Anad military base, one of the most important military installations in the south. Resistance fighters along with coalition forces have reportedly gained a number of positions there.

In Shabwah, fierce fighting has been taking place in Bayhan district, which is controlled by pro-Houthi/Saleh forces. In the clashes, Islah Party members have reportedly been killed.

November 3–9: Fighting intensifies on multiple fronts as Geneva talks approach

With new peace talks fast approaching, the ground fighting continues to escalate rapidly on several fronts across Yemen and across the border with Saudi Arabia, while the Saudi-led coalition’s aircraft continue to provide local anti-Houthi fighters with aerial support and weapons. Ground fighting has been swiftly intensifying in or around six Yemeni cities since early last week, while the new round of UN-sponsored talks aiming to end the conflict in Yemen is just few days away. The new peace-talks session is expected to take place in Geneva on November 15. On Sunday, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon flew to Riyadh to reinforce the push for a peaceful political settlement among the warring parties. Having finalized the initial negations ahead of the upcoming talks in Geneva, delegates from the Houthi Movement and the General People’s Congress party (GPC) returned from Muscat on Friday to brief their leadership in the Yemeni capital, Sanʻa. The exiled government in Riyadh has already assigned five representatives for the new Geneva talks. While the UN special envoy for Yemen appeared to be optimistic, several observers believe the talks are doomed to fail amid the escalated conflict on the ground.

In the central city of Taʻiz, clashes are taking place in downtown and intensifying in the eastern frontline, with both sides using heavy artillery and tanks. More than a dozen pro-Houthi/Saleh forces have been killed and wounded in an ambush; civilians have also reportedly been killed. While the pro-Houthi/Saleh forces surround the city from three sides, coalition airstrikes continue to target those forces. More reinforcement troops from the coalition, along with armored vehicles, have reached Taʻiz during the past week.

Near the Red Sea port of Mokha, pro-Houthi/Saleh forces claimed to hit a coalition warship, which they say is the fourth to be bombed.

In Ibb governorate, pro-Houthi/Saleh forces have taken control of Damt district near Dhaliʻ city, after fierce clashes with local resistance fighters left tens of dead on both sides. Although the coalition’s aircraft provided the resistance fighters with aerial support and weapons, the pro-Houthi/Saleh forces still control large parts of the district.

In Marib governorate, clashes erupted on new frontlines in the western districts amid airstrikes and artillery barrages. The local tribal fighters along with coalition forces are poised to capture al-Wakifah valley, some four kilometers outside the western district of Sirwah.

In the southern governorate of Lahj, near Aden city, fighting has escalated in what was seen as an attempt by pro-Houthi/Saleh forces to recapture Aden. On the other hand, 200 Sudanese and Gulf troops were reportedly seen leaving Aden, heading toward al-Anad airbase, where at least 400 coalition forces have been stationed.

Meanwhile, another Tropical Cyclone, Megh, battered Suqutra Island on Sunday, just days after Cyclone Chapala left at least three people dead and displaced hundreds from their homes on the island. One woman was reportedly killed while four other people were injured by the second storm.

Putting the Saudi "coup letters" in context

In September, several international news outlets reported on a set of letters, written by a member of the Saudi royal family (known in Arabic as Al Saud, the House of Saud), calling on the entire family to overthrow King Salman, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. None of these outlets, however, has published an English translation of the letters. We're doing so here for the first time. These letters deal only briefly with the war in Yemen, but the war--and the larger trend of military adventurism--is one of the author's major grievances with the Salman regime. You can download the full English text of the letters here. Below are some choice excerpts, followed by commentary on the letters by journalist and Chatham House Fellow Peter Salisbury.

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In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

An urgent alarm call to all the Al Saud

The peace and compassion and blessings of God be upon you.

All praise to God, Lord of the universe, and God’s peace and blessings be upon His most noble messenger.

This is advice and an alarm call to all the sons and grandsons of the Founder, the late King Abdulaziz, who receive this letter....

The Founder brought us up on a set of principles that maintain authority, strengthen the state, and keep a balance in the country between the ruler and the ruled. We learned from him that maintaining authority requires that power should be held only by the oldest and most suitable, and that they should make the others share in their decision-making; that the character of the state should remain Islamic and pure; not to compromise the application of Sharia; to respect religious scholars and preserve their role in society; and to value notables.

The late Founder also taught us not to mix authority with business, to take our share of public money formally and not stretch out our hands in cheating, deception or fraud, what is now known as corruption and embezzlement. We also learned from him to adhere to good morals and religious correctness, and when plagued with something, not to shout about it, or be defiant. We learned to give people their value, to behave modestly in the majlis, and to accept advice; not to turn down a petitioner, not to close the door, not to reject those who ask, not to let down the oppressed, not to help the oppressor.

Some of these recommendations began to be neglected, and the wise men did not react to stop those who breached them, which lead to compromise in the rest leading to neglect of all the recommendations. We came near to collapse of the state and loss of authority. Disaster is closing upon us and others. The last of the neglected recommendations was marginalising the elders and the experienced, and handing over authority to juveniles and foolish dreamers who act behind the facade of an incompetent king....

How for example did we accept that the sons of Abdulaziz should be marginalised both in power and in participation in decision-making? How did we accept, passively and without intervening, the King’s mental condition which renders him unqualified to continue in authority? How did we accept that a person close to the King should dominate the country politically and economically, and leave him to make plans at his will?

Furthermore, how did we accept a foreign policy that weakens our people’s trust in us and incites the peoples of other countries against us? How did we accept engaging in uncalculated military risks, such as the military alliance to strike Iraq and Syria, and the Yemen war? How did we accept that our fate should be hostage to the whims of adolescents and impetuous caprice?...

Thirteen sons of King Abdulziz are still alive, and between them they possess great competence and experience, particularly Princes Talal bin Abdulaziz, Turki bin Abdulaziz and Ahmed bin Abdulaziz with their great ability and well-known political and administrative experience which should be harnessed in the interest of religion, the Holy Places, and the people.

The abovementioned three in particular and all thirteen sons of the Founder in general should carry the banner, gather consensus, and assemble the ranks of the House of Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman al-Faisal al-Saud, led by the oldest and best of them and their capable sons—who are a treasure imperishable if God wills—to act and remove all three, the incapable King Salman bin Abdulaziz, the negligent, impetuous and arrogant Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, and the thief, corrupt, destroyer of the nation Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—just as King Faisal, his brothers, and their sons and cousins did when they removed King Saud—so that the best and oldest can take charge of the affairs of the country and its people....[/box]

Read the full text of the letters here.

I asked journalist and Chatham House Fellow Peter Salisbury a few questions to help us gauge the importance of these letters in the context of internal Saudi politics.

YPP: How much importance should we ascribe to these letters? Assuming the author isn't capable of pulling off an actual coup, what, if any, change can other members of the royal family hope to achieve? Salisbury: The surprise with these letters isn’t that they have appeared; it’s that it has taken so long for them to do so.

When King Salman appointed two members of his Sudairi branch of the family, his nephew Mohammed bin Nayef and his favourite son Mohammed bin Salman, who may have been as young as 29 at the time, as first and second in line to the throne, it sent shock waves across the Saud family [Will's note: "Sudairi" refers to the descendants of King Abdulaziz and Hussa bint Ahmad al-Sudairi, including the so-called "Sudairi Seven," the most powerful grouping of Abdulaziz's many sons].

At the time, a lot of reports on the appointments  focused on generational change - it was the first time in Saudi Arabia’s modern history that one of Abdulaziz al-Saud’s grandchildren rather than sons had been made crown prince - and on the youth of his son after years of septuagenarian crown princes. But the bigger issue for the Al Saud was that King Salman had concentrated current and future power in the Kingdom in the hands of one branch of the family. Some analysts described the move as being, in effect, a palace coup, with the King also setting his son up as future monarch. The author of the letter is fairly clear on this point: “How… did we accept that the sons of Abdulaziz should be marginalised both in power and in participation in decision-making?” he writes.

So the rest of the family  - the descendants of Abdulaziz’s other sons - were unsurprisingly unhappy. But the King's war in Yemen and the young Prince became very popular in the early months of King Salman’s reign, thanks in no small part to glowing domestic media coverage. It would have been very risky indeed to publicly criticize King Salman or the Mohammeds. Eight months in to King Salman’s reign, it looks like the author of the letter has exhausted internal channels for expressing his frustrations and has turned to the Western media, which has by and large been very critical of the war in Yemen and tends to be pretty critical of the House of Saud and the West’s relationship with the regime.

That makes the letter feel a bit like a desperate last attempt to get King Salman to reverse course on the succession issue, by someone trying to carve out a political space for themselves. It’s interesting to see this happen, and critics of the Saudi regime will of course latch on to it but I am not sure what impact if any it will have on the actual internal workings of the state, especially given that the concentration of power within the Sudairi family is continuing apace (the author talks about mixing ‘authority with business’ which is a pretty clear attack on the deputy crown prince -  a lot of the letter is an attack on hism - who has taken a big role in managing the economy, took over the lucrative position of head of the Royal Court, and has been accused of redirecting a lot of business and patronage to his own inner circle, which is in reality fairly standard practice when a new King takes over).

I could be wrong of course, but this isn’t actually the first time something like this has happened and in general the impact has been pretty limited. The author seems to recognize this: “[T]ime goes by quickly, and each day that passes makes it more difficult to grip the matter than the day before”, he wrote in September, and two months on we haven’t seen any movement.

YPP: In addition to King Salman, the letters call out Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Nayef in particular. Is it accurate to view the two Mohammeds as allies/partners, or do they each have different agendas? In other words, would Mohammed bin Salman be likely to retain his current position of power in the event of Salman's death? Salisbury: First, a disclaimer: a lot of analysis of the inner working of the House of Saud tends to devolve into Kremlinology - people trying to derive meaning from what little information emerges from inside the Palace (well, the Palaces but you get what I mean). So what I am providing here is my best educated guess.

As far as the two Mohammeds - MbN and MbS, as they are known - are concerned, it’s worth remembering that MbN was a widely acclaimed figure in the Saudi media in the past and that he has been seen as the US’ favorite Prince since the turn of the millennium thanks to his role in taking on Al Qaeda inside the Kingdom. Now we’re seeing him being eclipsed in media terms by MbS and it is difficult to know if that's a choice and he’s taking a knee, staying out of the limelight, and if so why - because he isn’t happy with the Yemen war (as many suggest)? - or because he doesn’t have much of a choice; or as some people suggest because he is happy to give his young cousin enough rope to hang himself with. But either way, MbS has become incredibly visible in the Saudi press while MbN is a much quieter figure these days.

Nevertheless MbN is in a strong position to become a very popular King: he’s young enough to have a few decades on the throne and if he succeeds Salman will be the first of his generation to become King. He is likely to be wary of MbS, who is in the process of gathering an awful lot of power around himself with respect to not just the military but also the economy. So theoretically it might make sense for MbN to do what King Salman did and completely change the line of succession. But they are from the same branch of the family, and I suspect that the Sudairis as a unit will be keen for the two Mohammeds to remain on friendly terms to ensure that power is concentrated within the family for the foreseeable future. A lot, of course, depends on how long of a reign King Salman has, how various aspects of current foreign policy play out, and how the oil price and economy fare in the next five years or so. YPP: What other important groupings or factions exist within the royal family, and how might their priorities differ from the current ruling faction? Salisbury: Basically, the other factions are the remaining sons of Abdulaziz and the sons of his children, particularly the offspring of former Kings and senior Princes, who are worried that their branches of the family may be robbed of their inheritance - i.e. a fair shot at the throne in the future. Abdulaziz had an estimated 45 sons and a similar number of daughters so being a Saudi Prince is a bit like like having the surname Smith in the UK or US.

The author of the letter mentions a number of the most prominent former Kings and Princes - Saud, Faisal, Khaled, Fahd, Nayef - while taking a swipe at the previous King, Abdullah, and at  Salman so I think it’s fair to guess he isn’t from either of these branches of the family. It’s also interesting that he refers to the 13 living sons of Abdulaziz and puts forward a list of potential candidates for King who are fairly low-key and would likely not overstep the mark when it comes to marginalising the rest of the family.

The issue for the rest of the al-Saud is that if the Sudairis become the only branch of the family who are considered for succession, everyone else will become increasingly removed from the levers of the state and hence prime opportunities to receive and distribute patronage.  That means their influence and power will be eroded, and that their ability to angle for future posts or crown prince roles will also be limited. So the issue really is one of being marginalized in the long term, and of a power-grab by a single branch of the family, which in and of itself is seen by many Princes as breaking the rules.