A round-up of important stories from the past week, by YPP intern Joshua Levkowitz. March 2- Comprehensive article on current president Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi. He is considered to be the only viable presidential candidate for the country's next presidential election, likely to be held in 2015.
UN Security Council approves new resolution on Yemen
Yesterday the United Nations Security Council voted to approve Resolution 2140, which you can read in full right here. There's a lot of fairly standard stuff in the resolution about how the UNSC supports Yemen's democratic transition, but the important part starts at paragraph 10, under the heading "Further Measures." Bottom line: after two years of threatening to do so, the UNSC is finally establishing a framework by which to impose sanctions on specific individuals who are obstructing Yemen's political process. In more detail:
11. Decides that all Member States shall, for an initial period of one year from the date of the adoption of this resolution, freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 19 below, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and decides further that all Member States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities designated by the Committee;
15. Decides that, for an initial period of one year from the date of the adoption of this resolution, all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 19 below, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;
17. Decides that the provisions of paragraphs 11 and 15 shall apply to individuals or entities designated by the Committee as engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen;
“18. Underscores that such acts as described in paragraph 17 above may include, but are not limited to:
(a) Obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition, as outlined in the GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanism Agreement;
(b) Impeding the implementation of the outcomes of the final report of the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference through violence, or attacks on essential infrastructure; or
(c) Planning, directing, or committing acts that violate applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or acts that constitute human rights abuses, in Yemen;
Sanctions Committee
“19. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council (herein “the Committee”), to undertake to following tasks:
(a) To monitor implementation of the measures imposed in paragraph 11 and 15 above with a view to strengthening, facilitating and improving implementation of these measures by Member States;
(b) To seek and review information regarding those individuals and entities who may be engaging in the acts described in paragraph 17 and 18 above;
(c) To designate individuals and entities to be subject to the measures imposed in paragraphs 11 and 15 above;
(d) To establish such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed above;
(e) To report within 60 days to the Security Council on its work and thereafter to report as deemed necessary by the Committee;
So basically, 2140 sets up a committee to designate the individual trouble-makers ("spoilers," in political-speak). That committee will also decide the specifics of sanctions to be applied to each spoiler, but in general we're talking about a freeze on all assets belonging to spoilers held in UNSC-member states and a ban on travel to or through UNSC-member states. As for who is going to be targeted by these sanctions, former President Saleh is probably at the top of the list. Foreign diplomats have also in the past suggested that Hirak leader 'Ali Salim al-Beidh be sanctioned. We'll have to wait and see who else makes the cut, but you can find a wide variety of conjectures and conspiracy theories on the subject on social media and in the Yemeni press.
Sanctions are tricky, and they don't usually achieve the desired effect right away. Naturally, Yemeni politicians (including the spoilers) are trying to spin the resolution to their own benefit. They're also probably squirreling away as much cash as they can, and coming up with new ways to make trouble.
You can watch the full UNSC discussion and vote on 2140 here, and watch UN Special Envoy Jamal Benomar's statements to the press here.
What do you think about the proposed sanctions regime? Is is a good idea? Will it backfire? Share your thoughts in the comments.
Press review 2/24/2014
Mafraj Radio Episode 9: Yemen's humanitarian crisis, human rights issues, and al-Mahrah's experiment in democracy
On this episode we discuss Yemen's dire humanitarian crisis with UNOCHA's Trond Jensen. We also get a rundown of key human rights issues from Belkis Wille, Yemen researcher for Human Rights Watch, and learn about an exciting experiment in local democracy taking place in al-Mahrah, Yemen's easternmost governorate.
UPDATE: The second segment of this episode, my interview with Belkis Wille of Human Rights Watch, includes a short discussion on the international community's repeated threats of sanctions against spoilers in Yemen. A few days after the episode aired, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to adopt a resolution setting up a sanctions committee. Read about that here.
UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) is responsible for coordinating international responses to humanitarian crises around the world. In Yemen, the office--headed by Trond Jensen--works to coordinate the efforts of more than 100 local and international NGOs to address Yemen's humanitarian crisis. Yemenis are suffering from food insecurity, lack of access to water, and severe poverty. In addition, several hundred thousand Yemenis have been displaced from their homes by conflict in the past decade. Our interview with Trond Jensen looks at the scope of the crisis, and challenges facing OCHA as it works to respond. You can find OCHA's website for Yemen here, with links to the recently-released Humanitarian Response Plan for 2014.
A few of the NGOs working in Yemen are listed below. While the international community will almost certainly fail to fully fund this year's Humanitarian Response Plan, you can do your part by donating to these organizations.
Human Rights Watch does an excellent job of tracking a number of important human rights issues in Yemen. Our interview with HRW researcher Belkis Wille covers President Hadi's failure to hold members of the former regime responsible for past abuses, the president's lack of control over the military, and the ongoing effort to raise the legal age for marriage and end child marriage in Yemen. You can also find Belkis Wille on Twitter. You can find all of HRW's reports on Yemen here.
Dr. Elisabeth Kendall is a senior research fellow at Pembroke College, Oxford. She spoke to us about her work on a groundbreaking public opinion survey recently undertaken in Yemen's easternmost governorate, al-Mahrah, and about the subsequent establishment of a new majlis, or representative council. This experiment in grass-roots democracy is particularly remarkable for the fact that al-Mahrah is extremely remote and sparsely populated. In 2011 the estimated population of the entire governorate was only 108,000. The new Mahri Majlis has a website, which is updated in Arabic and English, where you can find the Majlis code of conduct, and more information about how the council was formed.
Yemen's northern wars: a bad situation gets worse
Yemen's government gave up on fighting the so-called Huthi movement (known "officially" as Ansar Allah) back in 2010, but that hasn't stopped the Huthis from getting into conflicts with other groups in Yemen's northern governorates. In recent months, Huthi fighters have fought Salafi students in the town of Dammaj, militias linked to the Islah party in other areas, and fighters alligned with the Hashid tribal confederation's leading family, Bayt al-Ahmar. Right now, the Huthis are engaged in a very bloody campaign in 'Amran Governorate, where they seem to have taken control of key towns in the al-Ahmar family's archipelago of fiefdoms. [box icon="info"]For background on the Huthi movement, check out our segment on the origins and evolution of the movement, on episode #1 of Mafraj Radio. The Huthi segment, featuring journalist Adam Baron and scholar Madeleine Wells Goldburt, starts at 11:00[/box]
Sadiq al-Ahmar--the paramount shaykh of Hashid--and his brothers command a huge number of men at arms on their own, and they also have allies within Yemen's armed forces. One of the most troubling things I've heard today (specifically from Adam Baron and Shuaib al-Mosawa on Twitter) is that General 'Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, former commander of the infamous First Armored Division and current military advisor to President Hadi, is planning to/has already begun to involve his own forces in the conflict.
There are a few reasons why I find this possibility so worrying. First, 'Ali Muhsin is no longer officially a commander of military forces. It may be taken for granted by Yemenis and Yemen-watchers that he still has the loyalty of units from the disbanded First Armored Division (known in Yemen as al-Firqah), but on paper he is no longer their commander. The military restructuring process which followed 'Ali 'Abdullah Saleh's removal from the presidency also removed several members of the former president's family from their commands, but they too are assumed to retain a degree of de facto control over those forces. If 'Ali Muhsin were to commit "his" forces to combat in 'Amran, the facade of military restructuring would be shattered; such a move could encourage other shadow commanders--‘Ali 'Abdullah's son Ahmad, for instance--to take more active and visible roles. The Saleh-commanded factions of the military fought openly against al-Firqah in 2011; that conflict could be rekindled if rival units were to be put into action in the north.
Second, and this is clearly related to the first point, 'Ali Muhsin's overt involvement in the conflict would seriously undermine the presidency and the government. Of course, Hadi's leadership is already questionable, but there are degrees of undermined-ness. For President Hadi to have one of his top advisors engage in an undeclared war on his own initiative would be several degrees worse than the current situation.
Third, it seems unlikely to me that 'Ali Muhsin could commit a portion of Yemen's armed forces to this conflict without dragging the entire state along with it. The Sa‘dah wars of 2004-2010 grew so much larger and bloodier over time because the Yemeni army created new enemies everywhere it went. Local civilians and their tribes took up arms against the army in those wars not necessarily out of love for the Huthi leadership, but because the state had threatened their lives and livelihoods by putting boots on their land. What starts as a battle between al-Firqah and Ansar Allah will almost certainly expand, and other military units in the war zone will join the battle on one side or another.
Yemen has no shortage of crises and conflicts these days, and it's easy to see each negative development as just another chapter in a never-ended story of chaos. But the situation could always get worse, and some developments and decisions have the potential to make things much worse very quickly. In my opinion, we're looking at one such development in 'Amran right now.
Film Festival Preview, UCLA Library - Los Angeles, CA 1/12/2014
YPP director Will Picard and UCLA librarian David Hirsch host a screening of selected short films from the upcoming International Yemeni Film & Arts Festival. Following the screening, Picard and Hirsch will lead a discussion about the films' themes and their broader context in Yemeni society and the Yemeni diaspora.
Films will include:
Socotra: H’er wa Imshin, Felisa Jimenez. Yemen & Colombia, 2013, 36 minutes (World Premiere). This hauntingly beautiful documentary explores the social changes that have come to the remote Yemeni island of Socotra in recent years.
The Last Harvest, Jonathan Friedlander & Erik Friedl. USA, 2012, 23 minutes. This documentary, produced by UCLA researcher Jonathan Friedlander, explores the lives of Yemenis who settled in California’s San Joaquin Valley. At the peak of migration, some 5,000 Yemenis were employed in the fields of central California. Today only several hundred remain.
Karama Has No Walls, Sara Ishaq. Yemen, 2011, 30 minutes. Jumʻat al-Karama, the Friday of Dignity, on which pro-regime gunmen murdered over 50 revolutionary activists and wounded hundreds, marked a turning point in Yemen’s popular uprising of 2011. Filmmaker Sara Ishaq tells the story of the Karama massacre and its aftermath through the eyes of activists and their families. This film is currently on the short-list for an Academy Award nomination, the first such achievement for a Yemeni film.
A Stranger in Her Own City, Khadija al-Salami. Yemen, 2005, 29 minutes. In her first documentary, al-Salami shadows 13-year-old Nejmia, a girl who flouts custom by playing in the streets of Old Sanʻa “like a boy” and refusing to wear the hijab. Nejmia laughs off the taunts and curses of her neighbors, and captivates the viewer with her indomitable spirit.
The Big House, Musa Syeed. Yemen, 2013, 5 minutes. When a young boy finds a key to the empty mansion down the street, he lets himself and his imagination run wild in the big house.
Photo, Sawsan al-Areeqe. Yemen, 2012, 4 minutes. This simple but eloquent allegory celebrates the light women bring to Yemeni society despite all attempts at repression.
This event is free and open to the public, though UCLA charges for off-street parking. Light refreshments provided. Sponsored by the UCLA G.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies.
Sunday 1/12, 3:00-6:00pm Charles E. Young Research Library, room 11360
Mafraj Radio Episode 8: Revisiting al-Hirak, and meeting the future of Yemeni music
On this episode we talk with journalist Iona Craig about the complex reality of the Southern Movement, and we meet Ahmed Alshaiba, a young Yemeni ‘oud player who wants to change the future of Yemeni music.
Iona Craig writes for The Times of London, The Sunday Times, and USA Today, among others. She is also part of an exciting new subscription-based online platform, Beacon, which is trying to make freelance reporting a bit more sustainable by allowing subscribers to support writers directly. I recommend you read Iona's latest article on the Southern Movement once you sign up for Beacon. Iona tweets at @ionacraig.
You can check out Ahmed Alshaiba's Facebook page, and his Youtube channel, where he posts his latest tracks. Ahmed's tracks featured on this episode are, in order, "Adhhak 'ala al-Ayam," "Smooth Criminal," and "Dance in the Rain."
Yemen and the US: developing alternatives to perpetual war - Pasadena, CA, 11/17/2013
Join YPP executive director Will Picard for a presentation on the failures of US foreign policy in Yemen, followed by a discussion about why Yemen matters to America, and what Americans can do to build a more peaceful and constructive relationship between the two countries. At All Saints Church in Pasadena, 10:15am.
Mafraj Radio Episode 7: Inside Guantanamo, and Remembering Ibrahim
On this episode, we speak to attorney David Remes, who represents a number of Yemenis imprisoned at the US military detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, about his clients and the larger political context surrounding Guantanamo. We also remember Ibrahim Mothana, a young Yemeni activist who continues to inspire his colleagues in Yemen and people around the world.
Filmmaker and journalist Laura Poitras made the short film "Death of a Prisoner" for The New York Times in January 2013, on the death of one of David Remes' clients, Adnan Latif.
Yemeni blogger Noon Arabia also wrote about Ibrahim Mothana, and collected additional remembrances, for Global Voices Online.
Ibrahim Mothana, 10/23/1988 - 9/5/2013
Yemeni activist Ibrahim Mothana passed away in San‘a today. He was 24 years old. In those 24 years he accomplished more than most of us ever will. He was a prominent voice in Yemen's youth-led uprising, which began in 2011. He was a co-founder of the Watan Party, one of a few new political organizations to emerge from the revolution. He was also a prolific writer, who opined on Yemen's political and social challenges with insight, humor, and optimism.
A recital of his resumé does not do Ibrahim justice, though. He was 24 years old, and as someone of that age should, he defined himself by what he hoped and planned to do, rather than what he had already done. Ibrahim was devoted to his country, and he saw in Yemen as much potential as we all saw in him. Though a harsh and realistic critic of Yemen's flaws, Ibrahim believed in the idea of a New Yemen, which he and so many other revolutionaries struggled for. His hopefulness for his country was pragmatic; he understood better than most what it would take to build the Yemen he imagined.
For everyone who knew him, it is hard to imagine the New Yemen without Ibrahim. But just as surely as he will be missed, his work and his example will continue to inspire his colleagues, friends, and compatriots through the difficult years to come.
Ibrahim appeared on episode two of the YPP's Mafraj Radio podcast.
Mafraj Radio Episode 6: US Intelligence, Addressing the Water Crisis, and Celebrating Ramadan
On this episode, we get an inside look at the US intelligence system with journalist and former intelligence analyst Joshua Foust, we discuss Yemen's water crisis with UNDP advisor Walid 'Ali, and we learn about Ramadan traditions from the creator of Yemen Kitchen, Wigdan al-Guneid.
This is probably the longest episode we've done so far, and I think that's a good thing. The interview with Joshua Foust, which opens the episode, covers subjects that aren't discussed in any discussion of the US counter-terrorism program that I've seen elsewhere, and I think it's very valuable for both critics and supporters of US policy to understand how the intelligence system works. I didn't edit much out of that interview because it's so important, and because Josh's personal insights are such an asset to the discussion. We'll definitely be returning to different aspects of US policy in future episodes.
The water crisis is another subject that we'll be exploring in multiple episodes. On this episode we talk to Walid 'Ali, who oversees the environmental portfolio for UNDP in Yemen. Our interview includes a discussion of some of the possible solutions to the water shortage.
To wrap up the episode, we talk to Wigdan al-Guneid, the creator of a unique blog where she writes about Yemeni food and Yemen's cultural history. Wigdan tells us about how Yemenis observe the holy month of Ramadan and the holiday of 'Eid al-Fitr.
About our guests:
Joshua Foust: Joshua Foust is freelance journalist with a broad background in counter-terrorism and foreign policy. He currently edits the “State of Play” collection at Medium, a new platform for writing online, which covers foreign policy issues. For its entire production run, April 2010 to May of 2013, he was the national security columnist for PBS Need to Know, a weekly magazine show.
Joshua has also written for The Atlantic, the New York Times, the New York Daily News, the Christian Science Monitor, Foreign Policy, The American Prospect, and the Columbian Journalism Review. In November of 2010 he published his first book, Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net, which was praised by the New York Times as “an attuned observer of the American-led effort in Afghanistan.”
From January 2011 to March of 2013, Joshua was a Fellow at the American Security Project. Before that fellowship, he was a senior intelligence analyst for the U.S. military, a civilian adviser to the U.S. military in Afghanistan, a political analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency in Yemen, and the in-house futurist for the U.S. Army’s Intelligence and Security Command.
Joshua tweets at @JoshuaFoust
Walid 'Ali: Walid Ali is climate change and environmental policy advisor at the UNDP office in Yemen. He oversees a number of projects relating to environmental and natural resource management.
Wigdan al-Guneid: Wigdan al-Guneid is from the city of Ta‘iz in lower Yemen. Currently residing in the US, she is an architectural designer, and is passionate about Yemeni food, culture, and history.
Follow her on Twitter at @YemenKitchen
Summary: NDC Youth Hangout
Last month, a group of prominent Youth activists held an online discussion via Google Hangout. The discussion was in Arabic, so I asked YPP intern Shelby Jamerson to write up a brief summary for our non-Arabic-speaking readers. The full video of the Hangout is available here. You can learn more about the National Dialogue Conference and the work of the Youth delegates on episodes 2 and 5 of the YPP podcast, Mafraj Radio. Take it away, Shelby: Yemen's so-called Independent Youth (young activists who are not affiliated with any mainstream political party) have 40 representatives participating in Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference. Add to that the designated "youth" delegates from other participating parties, and Yemeni youth compose 20% of the dialogue’s body. The Independent Youth, who played a pivotal role in the removal of former President 'Ali 'Abdullah Saleh from office in 2012, have continued to play a central role in the development of a new Yemen. However, many are feeling frustrated with the challenges facing the success of the NDC. On July 15, 2013, Youth activists gathered together to discuss issues and field questions received via YouTube comments and tweets. Here are some of the issues discussed:
Though the NDC comprises members from a wide variety of backgrounds, the youth who make up around 50% of the population feel underrepresented in the talks; they are afraid that their voice is not strong enough to compete with other factions.
- Though foundational for starting a new Yemen, Ghanem Sahar expressed concern that the NDC is a political process meant to assuage tensions outside of the dialogue rather than provide solutions to pressing issues like Southern separation and the Sa’da issue.
- The youth are emphatic about the need for a real constitution to govern the emerging Yemeni state. For Yemen to succeed in creating a new state, there must be a new constitution with clearly defined institutions, political parties, equality, and inclusion. The new state must embrace the idea of a united Yemen where there is no distinction made between north and south or women and men.
- Delegates involved in the dialogue are concerned about the regions that Yemen will split into.
- While the NDC must endeavor to provide a political solution to the Southern issue, delegates expressed concern that this will not end the violence or unrest. The NDC must provide a solution that addresses all of the people’s concerns including education, poverty, health, and basic needs.
- Finally, the youth desire to see a civil state created.
Mafraj Radio Episode 5: NDC update & living in the dark
On this episode, we get an update on the progress of the National Dialogue Conference from NDC youth delegate Baraa Shiban and analyst Fernando Carvajal, and we talk with journalist Iona Craig about Yemen's electricity crisis. Our interview with Baraa also touches on the issue of the continued illegal detention of revolutionary activists. We didn't include much background on the electricity situation in this piece, so I encourage listeners to read these two articles on the subject by Adam Baron:
About our guests:
Baraa Shiban Baraa Shiban is one of the representatives of independent youth activists in Yemen's National Dialogue Conference. He was a prominent activist in the 2011 popular uprising in Yemen, and is an outspoken critic of repression, corruption, and foreign interference in Yemen. He previously appeared on episode 2 of Mafraj Radio.
Fernando Carvajal Fernando Carvajal is an analyst, consultant, and author who has been studying Yemen since 2000. He is a frequent contributor to the YPP blog, and a PhD candidate at the University of Exeter.
Iona Craig Iona Craig is a freelance journalist based in San’a, and The Times of London Yemen Correspondent. She also writes for USA Today, The Sunday Times and regularly contributes to The National (UAE) and Index on Censorship. She tweets at @ionacraig.
Mafraj Radio Episode 4: The Foreign Press Corps
This episode features highlights from a conversation with journalists Jeb Boone (Global Post, CSM), Tom Finn (The Yemen Times, The Guardian), and Laura Kasinof (The New York Times), about their experiences in Yemen--which include covering the 2011 uprising--and their observations on contemporary journalism.
About our guests:
Jeb Boone Jeb Boone is a journalist, former managing editor of the Yemen Times, and blogger at GlobalPost's "The Grid". Boone's work has appeared in The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, Time Magazine, Foreign Policy, The Christian Science Monitor, The Guardian, The Independent, The Sunday Telegraph, and Global Post. He has also appeared on the BBC World Service, BBC World News, Sky News, and Anderson Cooper 360. Jeb tweets at @JebBoone
Tom Finn Tom Finn is a British freelance journalist currently based in New York.
He lived in San‘a from 2010 until June 2012, where he worked as an editor at the Yemen Times and later as a freelancer, reporting on the mass uprising and military infighting that ended the 33-year rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh. He has written for The Guardian, TIME, Reuters, Foreign Policy, The Economist, Newsweek, and other publications.
A recipient of this year’s Alistair Cooke Award in Journalism, Tom is currently completing an MA in Journalism and Middle Eastern Studies at New York University. Tom tweets at @TomFinn2
Laura Kasinof Laura Kasinof is a freelance print journalist. From 2009– March 2012 she was based in San‘a where she reported regularly for The New York Times on Yemen’s uprising.
Her articles have also appeared in The Economist, Foreign Policy, The Christian Science Monitor, San Francisco Chronicle, and Al Jazeera International, among others. She has appeared on radio and TV outlets such as BBC World Service, Democracy Now, Al Jazeera International and NPR. Laura has also been invited as a panelist to speak about Yemen at institutions such as the Atlantic Council, Chatham House, The New America Foundation and the National Counterterrorism Center.
She also helped produce the Yemen segment of the documentary-in-progress, Shake the Dust.
Laura graduated from New York University with a degree in Middle Eastern Studies and Politics. She lived between Cairo and San‘a for nearly five years. Laura tweets at @Kasinof
Mores sine legibus
Some in the media interpreted this week's big speech by President Barack Obama as a watershed moment in the development of US counter-terrorism and foreign policy. I say "interpreted"; what I mean is that White House officials worked throughout the week to push this understanding upon journalists and pundits, and some of them obliged by regurgitating this concept to their audiences. The White House pitched the speech as one part of a process of increasing transparency; it was anything but. You can read the full text of the speech for yourself, but in the mean time, allow me to summarize the important points as I understood them.
- The United States will continue to use targeted killing as its primary tool in dealing with known or suspected "terrorists" in Yemen and elsewhere. It will, however, continue to claim that it prefers to capture suspects whenever possible.
- The US will claim that it only kills individuals who it is certain pose a "continuing and imminent threat" to America, without ever informing America what any of those threats are or how they were discovered.
- The president is sickened by the very idea of civilian casualties; the civilians who have died keep him awake at night. But the president will not apologize for those who have already been killed, nor will he make reparations to their families.
- The US would really, really like to narrow the scope of its counter-terrorism operations and not get involved in any more wars, but we'll just have to see how the chips fall.
- The president of the United States would really like to close the extra-legal prison at Guantanamo Bay, but he may or may not be allowed by Congress and his own Defense and Justice departments to do this.
- The president will no longer forbid the courts or the military from ordering the repatriation of Guantanamo detainees to Yemen; however, those detainees already cleared for release by the courts and the military will not be repatriated yet. They will have to have their cases reviewed, again. The criteria by which those cases will be evaluated will not be made public.
If you heard or read something different, please comment.
The day before the speech, President Obama apparently signed a document that contains more detailed guidance for the country's intelligence and security apparatuses, but we don't know what that guidance is because the document is--wait for it--classified. So as far as I can tell, the president's idea of "being more transparent" consists of telling the public that he has written and signed another classified document. Impressive.
This has been the problem since the day Mr. Obama took the reins of America's counter-terrorism programs: every time the public, the press, or the courts has asked for information about how he and his team make decisions, he tells us to just trust that he's doing the right thing. These life-and-death decisions, these policies that determine the use of lethal force, all of this is being done with the utmost regard for the rule of law and the good of the nation, we are told. Our national path is being charted according to the president's unwavering moral compass. He has gone so far as to say that the constitutional guarantee of due process can be safely met by him and his close advisors, behind closed doors.
If that were the spirit behind the concept of due process, we would not have courts, or judges, or juries. We would not need laws concerning the powers of the president or the use of force if every president knew and instinctively carried out the most righteous and strategically sound policy at all times. It may well be that Mr. Obama has impeccable morals (I don't believe that to be the case, but I'm in no position to judge); but that is not the issue. Without laws, without a clear and transparent legal framework, there is no accountability, and no way to assess the justice or the utility of the administration's counter-terrorism policy.
Here's an actual quote from the background briefing a few "senior White House officials" held before the speech, in order to get the press and the assembled experts on the right page (emphasis added):
...you’ll also see that there are criteria listed, and some of them will be slightly different than the criteria, for example, that John Brennan noted in his Wilson Center speech. And it’s a sort of — it’s an [evolving] process. So one of the differences is we were looking at significant threats in the Wilson Center speech, and now we’re looking at continuing and imminent threats. And so that is, in a sense, one of the standards that has evolved.
That's right. This senior White House official is telling us that the White House has DECIDED TO START USING DIFFERENT ADJECTIVES, and that we should believe, from that decision, that the actual standards underlying the targeted killing program have changed. The problem is that the White House has never defined (in an unclassified document, say) any of those three adjectives, nor has it explained how the president decides to which individuals or actions they apply.
This "just trust me" approach was unacceptable before the president's "game changing" speech, and it is still unacceptable today. The president's deployment of strategic adjectives will not defeat al-Qa‘idah or protect America's interests; only drastic and comprehensive changes to America's foreign policy can do that. Maybe such changes really are in the works. As usual, I would absolutely love to be proved wrong. But for that to happen, the administration would have to actually tell us what it's planning to do, and submit those plans to legal and practical review.
*The title of this post is an inversion of my old university's Latin motto, "Leges sine moribus vanae," which, I'm told, comes from a line from the Roman poet Horace, and which (loosely) means "laws without morals are useless." My correlate, then, translates roughly to "morals without laws are useless."
Images from Yemen & the Middle East - Costa Mesa, CA, 6/8/2013
On June 8, the Yemen Peace Project will be co-hosting a photography event in Costa Mesa featuring images from Yemen, Lebanon, Palestine, and elsewhere in the region. This event, a collaboration with the talented Jenny Lynn, is part of our organization's Artistic Outreach program, which uses art to promote understanding.
Alongside Jenny's outstanding work, we'll be showing stunning new photos by Alex Kay Potter, as well as images from our "Revolution in Their Eyes" collection, which was shown in DC, LA, and NYC in 2011-2012. This collection features photographs from Change Square, the heart of the 2011 popular uprising in San‘a, by AbdulRahman Jaber, Raja Althaibani, Atiaf Alwazir, Ghada al-Wazeer, and Benjamin Wiacek.
This event is free and open to the public; refreshments will be provided. We'll also be raising funds at this exhibition for our 2014 Film and Visual Arts Festival, so donations are encouraged. See you there!
When: June 8, 2013, 6:00 PM
Where: Location 1980 Gallery, Costa Mesa, CA
Interview with Farea al-Muslimi
Episode 3 featured an excerpt from an interview we recorded last month with writer and activist Farea al-Muslimi. Because the interview contained much more valuable material than we could fit into a single segment, we decided to post the full interview here. We start off with Farea's reflections on recent visits to the embattled southern province of Abyan. After that, we discuss Farea's personal connection to the United States, and his views on US policy toward Yemen. Today, Farea became the first Yemeni to participate in a US congressional hearing on Yemen-related issues. The Senate Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights held a hearing on "The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing"; Farea joined two high-level military officers and two legal experts on the witness panel. He was by far the most impressive of the witnesses.
You can watch the entire hearing here. Farea's full written testimony, which is a moving and informative read, is here.
Farea's five-minute oral testimony is here:
Mafraj Radio Episode 3
In this episode we take our first look at the efforts of the international community in Yemen, a subject we'll come back to in several future episodes. The first segment features an interview with the UK's ambassador to Yemen, Mr. Nicholas Hopton, who summarizes for us his government's role in the country's affairs. This is followed by a chat with Ms. Kate Nevens of Saferworld, who talks about the non-governmental side of things. The episode wraps up with an excerpt from an interview with Yemeni writer and activist Farea al-Muslimi, who shares a personal perspective on US-Yemeni relations.
About our guests:
Ambassador Nicholas Hopton From the Ambassador's official bio: "Nicholas Hopton was appointed Her Majesty’s Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen in December 2011 and took up his post in January 2012. Nicholas is a career diplomat who joined the FCO in 1989 having studied at St Peter’s School, York, and Cambridge University (Magdalene College). He has also studied at La Sapienza University in Rome and ENA in Paris. With the FCO he has served overseas in Paris, Rome, Morocco and Mauritania. He is married with five children." Read Al-Sharq al-Awsat's interview with Ambassador Hopton here. Ambassador Hopton tweets at @NicholasHopton.
Farea al-Muslimi Farea al-Muslimi is a young journalist and activist based in San'a. He has made several trips to Abyan to report from areas formerly controlled by AQAP. He wrote about some of the issues covered in this interview here. Earlier this week, he wrote about a US air strike on his own village in Dhamar Governorate.
Kate Nevens Kate Nevens directs Middle East and North Africa Program at Saferworld, a UK-based international NGO. "Kate previously worked as the manager of the MENA programme at Chatham House, an international affairs think tank based in London, with a particular focus on youth and political inclusions issues in the region and international involvement in fragile states." Kate tweets at @KateNevens.
Please note: the lack of internet access and the state of the mobile phone network in Yemen makes it difficult to record high-quality interviews with people there. Please excuse the poor sound quality; we feel that the content is well worth the auditory discomfort.
Mafraj Radio Episode 2
In the second episode of Mafraj Radio, we take a look back at the Youth Revolution of 2011 with Ibrahim Mothana, and go inside the long-awaited National Dialogue Conference with a member of the Youth delegation, Baraa Shiban. We also get an update on the situation in 'Aden from activist 'Alaa Isam.
Here's the full video of Youth delegate Mubarak al-Bahar's opening address to the National Dialogue Conference, quoted in Act 1:
Here's the Aden Live TV segment quoted in Act 2, in which the pro-Hirak satellite channel covers demonstrations and crackdowns in 'Aden.
Yemen's legacy families: between reconciliation and exclusion
Friend of the blog Fernando Carvajal reflects on a social group that is often overlooked in discussions of Yemen's political scene: families that made up the political elite in pre-unification and pre-republican Yemen. Fernando is a PhD candidate at the University of Exeter, and has studied and worked in Yemen for over a decade. As Yemenis live through phase one of the National Dialogue Conference, launched March 18, insiders and international observers work through pessimism, limited transparency, and an abundance of caution. The process itself has marginalized revolutionary elements from among the youth bulge and has failed to encourage southern participation. Added to the list of excluded groups now are various legacy families with their own historical grievances.
The process of incorporating independent youth elements to the Dialogue is much easier than observers have described. Strong young candidates have been identified by credible actors, yet a mix of hesitation by the international community and a complete refusal by traditional actors to recognize revolutionary ideas continue to marginalize those with credible grievances and street power. The more difficult issue haunting the transiton process remains the exclusion of legacy families from the north and south with grievances. The families of northern political actors affected by fifty years of intra-regime conflicts continue to struggle to find a role since the start of the 2011 uprising and now within the Dialogue process. Southern political actors, whether in Sanʻa, in the south, or abroad also find themselves struggling to fit into the process.
This year the Republic of Yemen will celebrate the fifty-first anniversary of the 26 September revolution against the Imamate of Al Hamid al-Din, and the forty-sixth anniversary of southern independence from British rule. In the north, conflict was never restricted to fighting between Royalists (supporters of the Imam) and Republicans (supported by Gammal 'Abd al-Nasser). Internal conflicts within both camps not only obstructed peace processes but also contributed to prolonged elite conflicts. The Hamid al-Din family, much of which has lived in exile since 1962, are not alone in demanding relief for their own grievances. Relatives of ousted president Abdullah al-Sallal and murdered president Ibrahim al-Hamdi are some actors among many other revolutionaries and sayyid families who believe the Dialogue must also address their concerns, as well as form part of the process bringing about a new Yemen.
In the south, contemporary politics are fixated on political actors such as ‘Ali Salem al-Baydh, ‘Ali Nasser, Haydar al-Attas, Mohammed ‘Ali Ahmed, Hassan Baʻoum and others leading the current uprising throughout southern provinces. Behind the scene there are other actors working arduously to ensure their voices are heard during the Dialogue conference or at minimum influence the process from behind closed doors. Such actors include southern sultans (al-Abdali, al-Kathiri, al-Qa’yti), tribal shaykhs and sharifs who—depending on whom you ask—were either forced to leave or left voluntarily before the establishment of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Many of them have lived in Sanʻa or elsewhere since 1967, and while not directly part of the northern regime they were never reclaimed by the southern government, nor were they accepted by southern actors during the Unification process of 1990. Since 1999 many of these actors expanded their activities to form a number of discussion forums where topics being discussed today were addressed, but never came to influence the regime in Sanʻa.
Intra-regime conflicts led to exile of revolutionary politicians and military offices in the Yemen Arab Republic, as well as numerous assassinations and ‘accidental’ deaths. In the south, those who opted to leave prior to 1967 were never allowed to reclaim their role in politics or their properties. Many of those who were pushed out in 1986 (known as Zumbra) did not have a role in the process of unification, but have been demonized for their role during the 1994 civil war as result of their support for ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh’s regime against separatists led by ‘Ali Salem al-Baydh.
Two generations in Yemen have grown up under conflicting historical narratives that have either ignored or demonized elites from both the north and the south. These ‘marginalized’ elites not only have an uphill climb vis-à-vis the current political structure, influenced by international actors and entrenched rivalries among centers of power, but also have to deal with the great distance between them and the current generation driving revolutionary ideas since February 2011. Even though youth in the north raised pictures of president al-Hamdi and revolutionary poet Mohammed Mahmoud al-Zubayri, young northern Yemenis have no connection with their progenies, and current elites have no incentive for including them. In the south, since 2009, youth only raised pictures of leaders perceived as their patrons, such as al-Baydh, and Baʻoum, the man who suffered from relentless northern harassment and oppression. This is the limited connection between the youth and the old guard in the south.
Many youth view legacy actors as merely part of the past and in no way find a role for them in the new process. The absence of trust extends beyond today’s institutions and political elites. Youth nationwide are unable to rally behind any political figure lacking potential staying power, and for any significant number of young Yemenis to eventually trust marginalized or exiled legacy elites remains very far away. The uphill battle for legacy elites will not end with exclusion from the Dialogue process. If they fail to position themselves in society once again during the transition period they may soon simply be relegated to history books written by non-Yemenis.